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INTRODUCTION 
The first wave of religious freedom claims was asserted by individuals 
complaining that governmental action interfered with their ability to act 
pursuant to their religion’s dictates.  The doctrinal and cultural response to 
these claims has been well documented, and there is a contemporary 
consensus in the United States favoring strong protections for individual 
religious liberty.1  Controversially, these protections largely come now from 
legislatures, not from courts’ enforcement of constitutional rights. Judicial 
constitutional protections nearly disappeared following the Court’s widely 
criticized opinion twenty years ago in Employment Division v. Smith,2 which 
upheld a law that substantially burdened religious practice because the law 
was neutral and generally applicable.  But after Smith, Congress and more 
than a dozen states enacted statutes that aimed to restore strong protections 
for individuals.3  As a result of this legislative action, as well as (or, more 
accurately, mostly due to) the widespread popular sentiment that gave rise to 
it, individual religious liberty remains strong in the United States.4  
 A second wave of religious freedom claims has been asserted with 
increasing frequency, in both judicial courts and the court of public opinion, 
on behalf of an array of religiously affiliated institutions.  Unlike the first 
wave, there is not presently a normative consensus as to what if any 
protections these institutions – originally churches, schools, hospitals, and 
social service organizations, but more recently corporations run by religious 
individuals -- should receive.  Evidence of this undecidedness can be found 
in the federal government’s chaotic responses in three recent arenas.  In a 
decidedly unsympathetic decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a public law 
1 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD:  AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM – AND WHAT WE 
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 235 (observing that Americans “all believe in religious liberty”). 
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  There is an extraordinarily deep opus of critiques.  For a particularly powerful 
example, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1109 (1990). 
3 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was overturned insofar as it 
applied to states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and thereafter enacted the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  More than a dozen states have passed 
legislation that mirrors the federal act that was declared to have beyond Congress’ powers in City of 
Boerne.  See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales:  A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S. 
DAKOTA L. REV. 466 (2010). 
4 See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization:  The Shaking Foundations of 
American Religious Liberty, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1755, 1756 (2011) (concluding that “religious liberty 
remains relatively vibrant and robust in the United States.”).  I do not mean to be pollyanish; there is 
troubling evidence that Muslims’ success of religious liberty claims is substantially less than other 
religious groups. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:  
Empirical Evidence From the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012).  But this unfortunate pattern is 
the exception proving the rule that, in the main, Americans are strongly supportive of religious liberty 
claims advanced by individuals. 
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school can refuse to register a Christian students’ organization that denied 
membership to gay students who would not agree to comply with the 
organization’s “Statement of Faith,”5 which forbade homosexual relations.  
Two years later the Court issued a strong institution-protecting decision, 
finding a “ministerial exception” that exempts churches from anti-
discrimination laws when making decisions to hire, retain, or discharge their 
ministers.6 Finally, last year the Obama administration tacked in the other 
direction, issuing regulations under the Affordable Care Act that required 
many religious employers -- including Catholic hospitals, universities, and 
colleges -- to provide health insurance to their employees that includes 
contraceptive devices and morning-after pills, the use of which is contrary to 
the Catholic Church’s tenets.7  Tens of lawsuits have been filed against this 
so-called “contraception mandate.”8 The Administration’s recent proposed 
amendments to the regulations have been rejected by American bishops for 
not going far enough.9 
 The governmental decisions described above all have generated 
considerable controversy, and there is not yet anything approaching a 
popular consensus as to how such disputes should be resolved.     Scholars 
have intervened, staking out two diametrically opposed positions.  One 
group has argued that churches are jurisdictionally independent of the state, 
and therefore beyond government’s regulatory authority, vis-à-vis matters 
within their domain.10 Scholars in this group have argued that churches have 
“prerogatives of sovereignty,”11  are “sovereign within their own 
spheres,”12are “entitled to legal autonomy,”13 and are properly conceptualized 
5 Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
6 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
7 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151 (2012). 
8 See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits Fights Coverage of Birth Control, THE NEW YORK TIMES A1 (January 
27, 2013). 
9 See Robert Pear, Bishops Reject Birth Control Compromise, THE NEW YORK TIMES (February 7, 2013). 
10 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions:  Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79, 125 (2009) (concluding that “any exercise of statue authority that falls within the 
proper scope of a coordinate sovereign sphere, like a religious entity, is beyond the state’s powers 
unless one of a limited set of exceptions applies”); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil Procedure and the 
Establishment Clause:  Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the 
Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 43, 65 (2008) (“some matters lie within an exclusive sphere 
of religion that is off limits to governmental regulation”); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a 
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55-56 (1998) (arguing that “the status of 
religious entities is acknowledged by the Establishment Clause, and a sphere is reserved in which 
religious entities may operate unhindered by government in accordance with their own understanding 
of divine origin and mission”). 
11 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 92 (1953).  
12Horwitz, supra note 10, at 83; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment:  The Church-State 
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (church and state are 
“coexisting sovereigns” with distinct “spheres of interest”). 
13 Id. at 119. 
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as foreign embassies.14  Several scholars in this group have begun extending 
these jurisdictional conclusions to religious institutions beyond churches.15 I 
shall call this the “Separate Spheres” approach. 
 The second group of scholars is well represented by an excellent 
forthcoming article by Professors Richard Schragger and Micah 
Schwartzman.16 They sharply critique the Separate Spheres claim, concluding 
instead that the state is the singular and supreme source of legal authority in 
modern polities.17 Grounding their approach in Locke, they instead argue 
that the church’s status is entirely derivative of the rights of its members, and 
that “general principles of freedom of association, privacy, and conscience 
are sufficient to protect all conscience-based associations, including 
churches.”18 Because this group of scholars essentially reduces churches to 
their individual members, thereby eliminating religion as a distinct sphere, I 
shall refer to theirs as the “Individualism” approach. 
  Drawing on John Rawls, this Article proposes a third framework for 
determining the appropriate relationship between religious institutions (i.e., 
not only churches) and the state. Like Individualism, my approach rejects the 
Separate Spheres view that religious institutions are jurisdictionally 
independent of the modern state.  In contrast to the Individualism, however, 
I argue that religious institutions’ status in liberal societies is best justified not 
on grounds of voluntary association, but individual self-actualization.  This 
provides a principled approach for determining what counts as a religious 
institution, and what protections such institutions are entitled to.  It further 
shows why, pace Individualism, religious institutions cannot be reduced to the 
individuals who compose them, but instead can be ‘greater than the sum of 
the parts’ of their constituent members.19 Concepts and legal doctrines 
14 Steve D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412. 
15 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Freedom of the Church, Religious Nonprofits, and Progressivism:  Comments on the 
HHS Mandate, 21 J. L. & CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES xx (forthcoming 2013) (“non-church institutions 
certainly have a sphere of exclusive authority over some internal decisions that affect their faith and 
mission”) (internal citation omitted); Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Fit Within the Freedom of 
the Church? (draft on file with author). 
16 See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against The Religious Institution Principle, 98 VA. L. REV. 
x (forthcoming 2013) (page references made to draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152060).    
17 Id. at 22 (“identifying religious institutions as presiding over a uniquely sovereign sphere clashes 
dramatically with our republican and democratic political commitments”).   
18 Id.at 5. 
19 I am grateful to Michael Paulsen for this metaphor. See also Esbeck, supra note 10, at 54 (suggesting 
churches are “not the mere sum of the derivative rights of their individual members.”); Richard W. 
Garnett, Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, and Constitutionalism, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 901, 907 (2009) (“an 
understanding of religious faith, and religious freedom, that stops with the liberty of individual 
conscience, and neglects institutions and communities, will be incomplete. And, so will the legal 
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developed in relation to individuals and expressive associations accordingly 
do not seamlessly transfer over to, and cannot adequately guard, religious 
institutions.20 I refer to my approach as the “Religious Institution 
Principle.”21  
The Article unfolds in five parts.  The first two parts elucidate and 
critique the approaches developed to date.  Part One addresses the Separate 
Spheres account of church autonomy.  The intellectual driver behind 
Separate Spheres has been sectarian theological suppositions that cannot 
reasonably be expected to be accepted by all citizens. Further, Separate 
Spheres is unworkable because government’s legitimate interests necessarily 
overlap with legitimate interests of religious institutions.  
Part Two describes and critiques Individualism.  Schragger and 
Schwartzman’s article, the most detailed explication of Individualism to date, 
ground their approach on John Locke’s Letter on Toleration.  Part Two shows 
Locke’s unsuitability for this task.  Locke’s justification is premised on 
theological assumptions not shared by many religions.  Further, critical 
analysis shows that Locke’s argument generates either virtually no  
protections for religious institutions, or problematically insulates them from 
all government supervision.  Finally, Part Two argues that, Locke aside, 
Individualism under-protects religious institutions.  
Parts Three and Four develop and apply an alternative account, the 
Religious Institution Principle, that I derive from John Rawls’ monumental 
works on political theory.22  The Religious Institution Principle has three 
fundamental implications.  First, religious institutions appropriately have a 
different status in society from most, possibly all, other associations. Second, 
the principle provides a basis for determining what qualifies as a religious 
institution.  Third, religious institutions do not have any inherent autonomy:  
some religions’ institutions fall outside the Religious Institution Principle’s 
protections, and those coming under the principle still may be subject to 
substantial government regulation.  
arrangements and constitutional structures that such an understanding produces.”) 
20 Cf Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 371,421-22, 428-41 (2012) (explaining why individual rights doctrines cannot adequately protect 
structural constitutional interests). 
21 To be clear, the “the Religious Institutionalism” that is the object of Schragger and Schwartman’s 
critique is what I call “Separate Spheres,” not my “Religious Institution Principle.”  
22 I draw primarily on JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996), but also from JOHN RAWLS, 
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A RESTATEMENT, JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (AND PUBLIC REASON 
REVISITED), and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE. 
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Parts III and IV flesh out these considerations, generating a robust 
normative framework for evaluating religious institutions’ claims.  In the 
process, the Article illustrates the framework’s analytic utility by applying it to 
many challenging issues past and present, including the polygamy decision in 
Reynolds v. United States, 23 sexual abuse lawsuits against clergy, the ministerial 
exception, the contraception mandate, the church autonomy cases, and many 
difficult hypotheticals.  The Article does not suggest that courts, legislatures, 
or the executive branch necessarily should use the entire framework; 
considerations of institutional competency and efficiency conceivably could 
demand that a particular institution use simpler prophylactic rules. But 
familiarity with the complete framework is crucial if responsible 
simplifications are to be made, and for there to be meaningful assessments of 
implemented simplifications.        
Part V anticipates, and responds to, an array of difficult challenges 
that might be leveled against the Religious Institution Principle.   
It is important to explain at the outset why and how this Article uses 
Rawls.  I invoke Rawls because his work is deeply powerful: as the Article 
explains, Rawls starts with minimal starting assumptions that can be affirmed 
by virtually everyone, and then generates a framework that provides 
substantial guidance to fairly structuring society’s political and social 
institutions. For these reasons, Rawls unquestionably is among our most 
important modern political theorists, and literally has shaped the way people 
world-wide think about political theory.24  By invoking Rawls I deliberately 
intend to engage with this international community, for this Article’s analysis 
has application to all liberal polities, not just the United States.     
But membership in the community of Rawls scholars does not entail 
treating Rawls’ writings as an unchallengeable canon of truth. To the 
contrary, his work serves as the starting point for critical analysis and, not 
infrequently, refinement.  Rawls thus becomes a focal point around which a 
sustained scholarly conversation occurs, which holds out the promise of 
generating deeper understandings than would emerge if each scholar aimed 
to develop her own approach ex nihilo.25   
This ‘focal point’ perspective has informed some of my own Rawls 
scholarship in the past, where I have critiqued and reworked aspects of 
23 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
24 See, e.g., Religion and the Limits of Liberalism, PHILOSOPHIA VOL. 40, ISSUE 2 (June 2012) (symposium 
with worldwide contributors focused on Rawls). 
25This aspiration is grounded in the Condorcet jury theorem, which concludes that increasing numbers 
of independent decisionmakers can improve decisional  quality.  For a critical discussion, see DAVID M. 
ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY:  A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 222-36. 
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Rawls’ work in the hope of better realizing his foundational objectives.26 It 
informs this one as well, for this Article suggests two ways in which the 
Rawlsian framework can be improved.  Though virtually all the Article’s 
conclusions are unaffected even if the reader rejects this Article’s two 
proposed emendations, the Article explains why their adoption would 
strengthen Rawls’ project.27  
I. SEPARATE SPHERES 
A. Description and Intellectual Origin 
Separate Spherists state that churches are “sovereign within their own 
spheres”28 and “entitled to legal autonomy.”29 Churches “preexisted the state, 
are transnational, and would continue to exist if the state were suddenly 
dissolved or destroyed.”30  The state’s capabilities and domain are distinct 
from the sacred domain that is the church’s, 31 and church and state 
accordingly are “barred from intruding into one another’s realms.”32  While 
most Separate Spherists recognize that “there are some appropriate occasions 
for state intervention,” these are said to be the “exception.”33  Separate 
Spherists have been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s recently decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,34 which 
recognized a “ministerial exception” barring employment discrimination 
claims against churches in relation to employment decisions concerning 
church ministers, though a careful reading of the opinion discloses that the 
Court did not adopt a Separate Spheres rationale.35   
26 See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State, 1 J. 
OF LAW, RELIGION & STATE 1 (2012); Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance:  A 
Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998). 
27 See infra Parts IV.B.3(b) & V.C. 
28Horwitz, supra note 10, at 83; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment:  The Church-State 
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (church and state are 
“coexisting sovereigns” with distinct “spheres of interest”). 
29 Id. at 119. 
30 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 55; see also Smith, supra note 14, at xx.  
31 See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 10, at 64; Pope Benedict XVI, God and Caesar (July 3, 2012) (last 
viewed at http://www.thecatholicthing.org/notable/2012/god-and-caesar.html on 2/20/2013) 
(“Fundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to 
God, in other words, the distinction between Church and State, or, as the Second Vatican Council puts 
it, the autonomy of the temporal sphere.”)    
32 Horwitz, supra note 10, at 84. 
33 Id. at 112. 
34 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).   
35 The Court held that the ministerial exception functioned as an “affirmative defense” rather than a 
“jurisdictional bar,” meaning that churches are not jurisdictionally independent of the state.  See id. at 
709 & n.4.  Further, the Court “express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, 
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious 
employers,” indicating once again that the Court was not treating churches as beyond government’s 
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There is little doubt about what has been the intellectual engine that 
has driven Separate Spheres.  Separate Spheres has a conceptual connection 
to, and has grown from, Christian theology.36  Prominent in many accounts, 
and not far from the surface in others, is the New Testament’s instruction 
that people are to “[r]ender therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; 
and to God the things that are God’s.”37,38  Another prominent, though 
unlikely, influence on many Sovereign Spherists is the nineteenth century 
Dutch theologian, journalist, and politician Abraham Kuyper. 39  As Kuyper-
inspired Separate Spherist Robert Cochran correctly observes while 
explaining his view of church autonomy in contemporary America, Kuyper 
believed that “God delegates authority to the state, but He also delegates 
authority to other entities, each of which is sovereign in its sphere.” 40 
Interestingly, Kuyper believed that what he called the “social spheres” – that 
is to say, “the family, the business, science, art, and so forth”41 – actually have 
an ontological priority to the state:  whereas the social spheres arose from 
“the order of creation,” the state is a product of human sin.42 No sphere’s 
regulatory powers.  Id. at 710.   Other parts of the decision, however, invoked language suggestive of 
Separate Spheres.  See, e.g., id. at 709 (ministerial exception “ensures that the authority to select and 
control who will minister to the faithful – a matter strictly ecclesiastical – is the church’s alone.”) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted). 
36 See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk:  The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 
1887 (2009) (“the commitment to church-state separation . . . arose in--and acquired their sense and 
their urgency from--a classical, Christian world view in which the spiritual and temporal were viewed as 
separate domains within God's overarching order”). 
37 LUKE 20:25. See, e.g., supra note 31; Steven D. Smith, American Religious Freedom:  The Revised 
Version 24-6 (describing Luke as implying “two different and independent authorities or jurisdictions,” 
which gave rise to “Augustine with the imagery of the ‘two cities’” and “Luther and Calvin with the 
imagery of the ‘two kingdoms’”, explaining that Luke 22:38’s reference to “two swords” “came to 
signify the distinct and separate temporal and spiritual powers,” and concluding that “[t]he idea of two 
separate and independent jurisdictions, temporal and spiritual, was a distinctively Christian notion”).   
38 This is not to suggest that this verse only can be interpreted as recognizing (or creating) separate 
temporal and sacred spheres, but that most of the advocates of Separate Spheres are Christians whose 
approach has been shaped, and sometimes explicitly justified, by their theological commitments. 
39Separate Spherists who draw on Kuyper include Paul Horwitz, supra note 10, at 83-84, 91-107, and  
Robert Cochran, Jr., see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and 
Catholic Insights 486, 487 in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, 
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., AND ANGELA C. CARMELLA, EDS., 2001).  Kuyper has been drawn on by 
many recent commentators who have sought to defend religious institutions.  See, e.g., William E. 
Thro & Charles J. Russo, Preserving Orthodoxy on Secular Campuses:  The Right of Student Religious 
Organizations to Exclude Non-Believers, 250 ED. LAW REP. 497, 507 & n. 63 (2010); Stanley W. Carlson-
Thies, Beyond Right of Conscience to Freedom to Live Faithfully, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 351 (2011-2012). 
40Cochran, supra note 39. Kuyper explained Calvinism’s “dominating principle” as being 
“cosmologically, the Sovereignty of the Triune God over the whole Cosmos, in all its spheres and 
kingdoms, visible and invisible.  A primordial Sovereignty which eradiates in mankind in a threefold 
deduced supremacy, viz., 1. The Sovereignty in the State; 2. The Sovereignty in Society; and 3. The 
Sovereignty in the Church.”  ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM (photo. Repreint 2007) 
(1931), at 79, quoted in Horwitz, supra note 10, at 94. 
41 Horwitz, supra note 10, at 95 &  n. 118 (quoting KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM, supra note 40, at 
27). 
42 Horwitz, supra note 10, at 96 & n. 129 (quoting Abraham Kuyper, Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM 
                                                                                                                              
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                8 
 
“God-given authority . . . . is subordinate to [any] other” sphere,43 though 
Kuyper thought the state to be responsible for “compel[ling] mutual regard 
for the boundary-lines of each” sphere and for “defend[ing] individuals and 
the weak ones, in those spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest.”44    
Separate Sphere’s close connections to sectarian theology is 
important for two reasons.  First, Separate Spherists cannot plausibly expect 
that their theological-based justifications will convince citizens who are not 
their co-religionists.45  In the other direction, the fact that Separate Spheres is 
part of, and arises from, its advocates’ understanding of the nature of reality 
and ultimate truth is relevant to determining the range of political 
arrangements that Separate Spherists plausibly can be expected to accept.46  
Later I will explain how Rawls’ account, from which the Religious Institution 
Principle is derived, has the conceptual resources for bridging these two 
observations:  The Religious Institution Principle provides a justification for 
religious institutions that plausibly can be thought to be acceptable to both 
religious Separate Spherists and to citizens who do not share their theological 
presuppositions. 
B. From Separate to Overlapping Spheres  
But what do modern Separate Spherists concretely want?   Schragger 
and Schwartzman suggest that Separate Spherists’ invocations of the 
language of sovereignty are “[f]or the most part . . . . metaphorical,”47 and 
this may be largely correct, at least for now.  After all, Separate Spheres 
advocates have not taken the position that “churches are literal and co-equal 
juridical entities with the power to exercise coercive authority.”48  Nor have 
they advocated for a restoration of the “benefit of the clergy, which 
exempted clergy charged with criminal offenses from secular courts and 
instead allowed them to be tried by far more lenient ecclesiastic courts,”49 or 
“for the return of a religious law that is of equal weight and runs parallel to 
the civil law, enforced by religious courts under religious auspices.”50  It is 
possible, though, that Separate Spherists may push in these directions if their 
present claims are successful. 
KUYPER:  A CENTENNIAL READER 1, 469 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998)). 
43 COCHRAN, supra note 40, at 488. 
44 KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM, supra note 40, at 97, quoted in Horwitz, supra note 10, at 96-7. 
45 For a point-by-point analysis and critique of several of the affirmative claims Separate Spherists have 
propounded, see Schragger and Schwartzman, supra note 16 (recounting and critiquing arguments 
based on pre-United States history and metaphysical “organic” claims).   
46 Rawls is particularly attuned to questions such as this, and we shall return to it later.   
47 Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 49. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 51. 
50 Id. 
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Professor Richard Garnett has offered what might be thought to be a 
suitably modest version of Separate Spheres, the “core” (though not the 
outer limits) of which he describes as “the freedom of the church to govern 
and order itself and the limits on the secular power to interfere with that 
governance”51 and the “independence of the church from secular control.”52  
Garnett also speaks more broadly about religion having an “existence” that is 
“outside, and meaningfully independent of” political authority.53   
But is even this normatively defensible?  The answer turns on what 
precisely Garnett means by the church having the “freedom” to “govern and 
order itself.”  In conversation, Garnett has expressed an absolutist 
understanding of this freedom,54 which is consistent both with the metaphor 
of separate spheres and the approach advocated by some other Separate 
Spherists.  But such an approach is undesirable, and to see why just consider 
the following six hypotheticals.  Separate Spheres 
1.     insists that the state not interfere with a church whose rules of 
internal governance provide that its adult high priests are to self-
immolate, or are to be sacrificed by other priests;  
2. precludes government from interfering with the corporal 
or capital punishments a church meted out to its priests, and 
perhaps its adult members too;55   
3. prevents government from stepping in to resolve 
competing claims that were issued by different churches, for 
instance Church A’s efforts to punish Priest Z with Church B’s 
claim that Priest Z is a member in good standing of its church;  
4. condemns imprisoning a child molester if he belongs to a 
religion whose church wants him to serve as a minister to a 
congregation not confined to a penitentiary;  
5. maintains that government must allow the “church of the 
avenger” to stock whatever weaponry they deem to be necessary to 
its mission, regardless of the dangers this might pose to 
neighboring non-church communities; and  
6. prevents government from imposing zoning and land use 
restrictions on a church whose self-understood mission requires 
skyscraping spires or  loud public calls to prayer (like Islam’s adhan).   
51 Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”:  (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, at 6-8 
(draft on file with author). 
52 Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 32 (arguing on behalf of “the church’s independence 
from state oversight and control over internal matters”). 
53 Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied). 
54 Garnett’s phrase need not be so understood, as is proven by freedom of speech’s coexistence with 
substantial regulation of speech.  Garnett’s statement that religion must be “meaningfully independent” 
of the state is best understood as being consistent with some state regulation.  
55 Cf. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, GOING CLEAR:  SCIENTOLOGY, HOLLYWOOD, AND THE PRISON OF BELIEF. 
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We can generalize from these six examples.  As hypotheticals 1-2 
indicate, Separate Spheres insists that government categorically withdraw its 
protective, paternalistic function from churches and priests, allowing 
churches to do whatever they wish to their priests.  As example 3 shows, 
Separate Spheres overlooks the fact that there are multiple churches today, 
each of which can simultaneously assert conflicting claims.  As examples 4-6 
illustrate, Separate Spheres requires that government categorically ignore the 
spillover effects that churches have on non-members.56     
If we (or Garnett) agree that society could intervene in even one of 
these circumstances, that would mean that the state could – sometimes, at 
least – intervene in the governance and ordering of churches.  This, in turn, 
means that the metaphor of “separate spheres” (as well as sovereign spheres, 
church autonomy, church sovereignty, and sphere sovereignty) misdescribes 
the political architecture of church/state relations: instead of separate 
spheres, there are overlapping spheres. And the spheres are overlapping 
because it is not possible, either in fact or normatively, to draw non-porous 
borders around churches that  separate their actions from non-church 
society’s legitimate interests. 
To be sure, overlapping spheres is considerably messier than separate 
spheres.  Overlapping spheres – the conclusion that some things (like what 
religious acts a priest can do) are  matters of church governance and state 
regulation  -- opens the door to conflicts because each institution could have 
a different view of what should be done.  Separate Spheres eliminates this 
possibility of inter-institutional conflict since, under it, only one institution 
has power to govern.  But the messiness of conflicts cannot responsibly be 
solved through ipse dixit assertions of separate spheres if two institutions 
properly exercise power.  And the six examples provided above show that 
church “governance and ordering” is not appropriately treated as a separate 
jurisdictional sphere.   
Not surprisingly, the Separate Spherists do not have the conceptual 
resources to resolve inter-institutional conflicts; Separate Spheres, after all,  
does not even recognize the possibility of conflicts.  The Religious Institution 
Principle does have the resources to deal with conflicts, as will be explained 
later.57  
56 See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 28-29 (making similar argument). 
57 See infra Part IV.B(3). 
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C. Overlapping Spheres in Federalism and Separation of Powers   
The conclusion that the relationship between church and state is 
better described as one of overlapping rather than separate spheres should 
not be surprising. To see why, let us return once again to Professor Garnett.  
He   plausibly suggests that the structural relationship between church and 
state is analogous to two well-known political structures within the American 
tradition, federalism and separation of powers.  Like federalism and 
separation of powers, Garnett says, the “differentiation of religious and 
political authorities” is both a “structure of our Constitution and an 
arrangement that contributes to its success.”58  Other Separate Spherists 
likewise have drawn parallels between their approach and these mainstay 
American political structures.59 
But this analogy suggests a valuable lesson that cuts against an 
absolutist understanding of church freedom:  despite a seemingly natural 
tendency to first conceptualize distinctive institutions (the sister states, the 
federal government’s three branches) as having separate spheres, these 
institutions have a structural relationship of overlapping powers.   
1. Federalism 
 First consider horizontal federalism, in particular the relationship 
among states’ regulatory authority.60  The early approach, expressed by 
Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, was precisely equivalent 
to the Separate Spherists’ understanding of the relationship between church 
and state.  Justice Story averred that “the laws of every state affect and bind 
directly all property . . . within its territory [ ]. . . and all persons who are 
resident within it,” and  wrote that “no state . . . can, by its laws, directly 
affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident 
therein.”61 Insofar as each state’s power extended to its physical borders, and 
no further, Story had described a political architecture of separate 
jurisdictional spheres.  Early Supreme Court cases echoed Justice Story’s 
approach.  An 1881 decision declared that “[n]o State can legislate except 
with reference to its own jurisdiction,” meaning within its own physical 
58 Garnett, supra note 51, at 10-11. 
59 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note x, at 109 (stating that sphere sovereignty “is consistent with our larger 
system of federalism, which divides various regulatory matters among a multitude of competing and 
cooperating sovereigns.”).  Others have made the connection as well.  See, e.g., Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, Global Citizenship, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2375, 2388-90 (2007) (discussing connection between 
Kuyper’s sovereign spheres, federalism, and separation of powers). 
60 The next three paragraphs draw from Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1145-47 (2010). 
61JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (2d ed. 1841). 
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borders, and that “[e]ach State is independent of all the others in this 
particular.”62 An opinion eleven years later asserted that “[l]aws have no 
force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts 
them.”63  
 This separate spheres approach to state regulatory powers, however, 
never squared with actual practice. States early-on applied their laws to 
persons, transactions, and occurrences that lay beyond their physical borders, 
with the result that state regulatory authority was overlapping rather than 
separate. For example, in 1819 the General Court of Virginia held that a 
Virginia statute which criminalized “all felonies committed by citizen against 
citizen, in any such place” supported the Virginia Attorney General’s 
prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a fellow Virginian’s horse 
in the District of Columbia, despite the fact that the Virginia citizen’s 
conduct also violated the District’s law.64 Consider also a nineteenth-century 
Texas law that provided that “[p]ersons out of the State may commit, and be 
liable to indictment and conviction for committing, any of the offenses 
enumerated in this chapter, which do not in their commission necessarily 
require a personal presence in this State.”65 Interpreting this law, an 1882 
Texas decision upheld the application of Texas’s criminal law to an act of 
forgery of a land certificate for Texas property even though all criminal acts 
had occurred in Louisiana and hence were also covered by Louisiana law.66  
 In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court formally recognized the 
power of states to regulate persons and things that lay beyond their physical 
borders. In Strassheim v. Daily, the Court permitted Michigan to prosecute a 
non-Michigander for acts defrauding Michigan that were undertaken in 
Illinois.67 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that “[a]cts done 
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental 
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had 
been present at the effect.”68  Today’s restatements and model codes 
explicitly acknowledge that states have the power to apply their laws 
extraterritorially,69  and the Supreme Court has observed that “a set of facts 
62Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). 
63Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892); see also  N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 
161 (1914) (stating “it would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the 
jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the States 
are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority.”). 
64 See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 174 (1819).  
651879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 454 (emphasis added). 
66 Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305–09 (1882). 
67 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911). 
68 Id. at 285.  
69 SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 
reporters’ note 5 (1986) (states within the United States “may apply at least some laws to a person 
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giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in 
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”70  
In short, although the states originally were conceptualized as having separate 
regulatory spheres, the Court now acknowledges that they have overlapping 
regulatory authority. 
The relationship between the federal and state governments, typically 
referred to as “vertical federalism,” also is characterized as one of 
overlapping rather than separate spheres.  First consider regulatory power 
from the federal perspective: as to most matters the federal government 
regulates, the states also have constitutional power to regulate.  For instance, 
both the federal and state governments have the power to regulate, and have 
regulated, such things as the environment, securities, automobile safety, the 
relationship between employers and employees, and unions.71 Indeed, the 
federal government even regulates some subjects that traditionally are viewed 
as falling exclusively within the domain of the states, like education72 and the 
family.73   
The significant regulatory overlap between the federal and state 
governments is most easily seen by considering preemption doctrine.  
Preemption questions arise whenever Congress enacts a statute that 
addresses matters that the states previously have regulated.  The conclusion 
that state law has not been preempted means that both federal and state law 
simultaneously govern -- a clear confirmation of overlapping regulatory 
authority.74  The contrary conclusion that state law has been preempted is 
not an indication that the states lacked regulatory authority before Congress 
legislated.  It instead indicates that (1) the regulated matter fell within both 
federal and state regulatory authority, (2) both the federal and state 
governments regulated the matter, and (3) the federal government’s 
regulation displaces the state’s, via the Supremacy Clause, because the state 
law is in sufficient “tension” with federal law.75  Since the acknowledgment 
outside [State] territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the State.”); MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f ) (1962) (State A may impose liability if “the offense is based on a statute of 
this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the State.”) 
70 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981). 
71 See generally Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 783-92 (2008). 
72 See, e.g., Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994); Improving 
America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518; No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425). 
73 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (showing 
extensive federal regulation of family law throughout our country’s history). 
74 See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008) (holding that the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act and Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act governed cigarette 
manufacturers’ advertising).  
75 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 743 (2008). 
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and resolution of conflict between governing authorities presupposes that 
both had regulatory power, preemption doctrine confirms the existence of 
extensive overlapping regulatory authority between the federal and state 
governments. 
Next, consider things from the states’ perspective: as to many 
(though not all) matters that the Constitution empowers Congress to 
regulate, states also have  the power to regulate.  For example, though the 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States,”76   the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that states also can sometimes regulate interstate 
commerce.77  Similarly, though the Constitution grants Congress the power 
to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,”78 this constitutional grant 
and “[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation do[] not diminish the 
importance of immigration policy to the States.”79  Accordingly, states are 
not without the constitutional authority to enact laws concerning 
immigration,80 though in fact there may be little room left for them to 
regulate, under preemption doctrine, on account of the federal government’s 
“extensive and complex” immigration laws.81   
In short, while there are some areas of exclusive federal regulatory 
authority, the political architecture of state/federal regulatory authority is 
overwhelmingly characterized by overlapping rather than separate spheres.  
2. Separation of Powers 
 Madison adopted a separate spheres understanding in the famed 
Pacificus-Helvidius exchange with Hamilton, where Madison argued that 
President Washington could not interpret a mutual defense treaty that 
potentially required America to join battle with France.  Madison thought  
only Congress could interpret the treaty on account of its power to declare 
war, reasoning that “the same specific function or act, cannot possibly belong 
to the two departments and be separately exerciseable by each. . . .  A 
concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the same 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
77 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851) (noting that the states have the 
authority to regulate interstate commerce in some circumstances). 
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.   
79 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). 
80 See, e.g. id. at 2507-10 (upholding provision of Arizona law requiring state officers to make a 
“reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest 
on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is 
unlawfully present in the United States”) (quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (West 2012). 
81Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
                                                   
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                15 
 
function with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in practice, as 
it is unnatural in theory.” 82   
 The extent to which Madison’s embrace of separate spheres was 
shared by other Framers and by the early Court is an interesting question that 
need not detain us here.  (It certainly wasn’t shared by all:  Hamilton 
disagreed, and President Washington acted on Hamilton’s advice and 
interpreted the treaty83).  What is central for present purposes is the 
contemporary consensus that the branches’ powers substantially overlap.  
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Steel concurrence is the accepted modern 
understanding,84 and Jackson’s second category comprises the President’s 
and Congress’ “concurrent authority,”85 which refers to overlapping 
presidential and congressional authority.  For example, there is broad 
agreement that the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers allowed him to 
collect foreign intelligence, and that Congress likewise has the power to 
regulate the collection of foreign intelligence under its powers to regulate the 
land and naval forces.86  Similarly, though the Constitution gives the 
President the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons,” 87 Congress can grant 
amnesties that, according to the Supreme Court, are functionally equivalent 
to pardons.88  Probably most important of all, however, is the rule-making 
undertaken by the executive branch’s administrative agencies.  The vast 
majority of contemporary federal law consists of agency generated 
regulations that, as many Supreme Court Justices and most commentators 
agree, are functionally equivalent to congressionally enacted statutes.89  The 
82 JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER II (1793), reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES 
MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING 68–69 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007). 
83  For a discussion, see Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1073-76 
(2010). 
84See Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown:  Against the View That Jackson’s Concurrence Resolves the 
Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1703, 1711-16 (2007).  
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring; see 
Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 84, at 1704-05 (explaining that Jackson’s second category 
reflects the understanding that presidential and congressional powers can overlap). 
86 See Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 84, at 1711-12. 
87U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
88Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (recognizing this and noting that the difference between 
pardons and amnesties is “one rather of philological interest than of legal importance” (quoting Knote 
v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877)). 
89See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court for “pretend[ing] . . . that the 
authority delegated” to an administrative agency “is somehow not ‘legislative power,’” advocating 
instead that “it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation 
cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (explaining that “by virtue of congressional delegation, legislative 
power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of 
new legislation”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
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Congress and executive branch hence have substantial overlapping authority 
to make the rules that govern citizen behavior. 
3. Judge and Jury 
 The pattern documented above regarding horizontal federalism -- an 
initial expectation of separate spheres giving way to overlapping powers – is 
found in lesser known contexts as well. For instance, whereas early Supreme 
Court case law understood that only juries – and not judges – had the power 
to find facts, judges today share significant fact-finding powers with juries.90   
To simplify a complicated story, the early twentieth-century decision 
of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. found unconstitutional a federal 
judge’s judgment that disregarded a jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence 
and directly entered judgment for the other party.91 The sole problem, 
according to the Supreme Court, was that the federal court had “pass[ed] on 
the issues of fact” by issuing a judgment for the other party.92  This was 
problematic on account of the Supreme Court’s separate spheres 
understanding of the relationship between judge and jury:  
In the trial by jury, the right to which is secured by the Seventh 
Amendment, both the court and the jury are essential factors. To the 
former is committed a power of direction and superintendence, and to the 
latter the ultimate determination of the issues of fact. Only through the 
coöperation of the two, each acting within its appropriate sphere, can the 
constitutional right be satisfied.93  
The Slocum Court cited considerable precedent dating back to the early 
nineteenth century that supported the view that juries alone had the power to 
find facts.94    
 But separate spheres soon gave way to overlapping powers.  In 
Galloway v. United States,95 the Supreme Court upheld the directed verdict 
under the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting judges 
to enter judgment after trial, but before verdict, on the ground of insufficient 
evidence.96 And in Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman,97 the Court held that 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2165, 2181 (2004) (concluding that administrative agencies 
exercise federal legislative powers). 
90 See Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, supra note 83, at 1080-87. 
91 Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co, 228 U.S. 364, 387–88 (1913). 
92 Id. at 387–88. 
93 Id. at 382 (emphasis added). 
94 See id. at 379-86. 
95 319 U.S. 372. 
96 See id. at 389–90; see also Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 599-613 (2003) (showing that earlier decisions had upheld directed verdicts 
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federal judges could not only disregard a jury’s verdict on grounds of 
insufficient evidence, but also enter a verdict for the other party -- the 
equivalent of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which had been held 
to be beyond a judge’s powers only twenty years before in Slocum.98   
 A careful look at Galloway demonstrates the extensive factfinding that 
the federal judges had performed.  Three dissenting Justices comprehensively 
reviewed the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced at trial and 
showed that the majority opinion, as well as the trial judge, had “weigh[ed] 
conflicting evidence” and made credibility assessments.99 The trial judge had 
issued a directed verdict against a veteran who had sued for benefits due 
under a war risk insurance policy. The veteran had the burden of proving 
“total and permanent” disability no later than May 31, 1919.100 The veteran’s 
guardian introduced testimony from a doctor who had diagnosed the veteran 
as suffering from a form of dementia that had been triggered by the shock of 
conflict on the battle field before 1919.101 The veteran also had offered the 
testimony of two fellow soldiers, a friend who had known him both before 
and after the war, and his commanding officer, all of whom testified to 
behaviors that were consistent with the symptoms of insanity that the 
testifying doctor had identified.102 In deciding against the veteran, the 
majority “re-examine[d] testimony offered in a common law suit [and] 
weigh[ed] conflicting evidence,”103 thereby engaging in the type of factfinding 
performed by juries.104  
Finally, and probably of greatest importance, federal courts deciding 
motions for summary judgment today determine if there is a “genuine issue 
as to any material fact”105 by asking whether “a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.”106 Under these standards, federal judges 
now “decide[ ] whether factual inferences from the evidence are reasonable,” 
where one of the parties had offered no evidence at all or where the court was asked to apply 
undisputed facts to the law).  
97 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
98 See id. at 661.  
99 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 383–84 (majority opinion). 
101 Id. at 408 (Black, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 408–12. 
103 Id. at 397.   
104 See Sward, supra note 96, at 603 (“The issue in Galloway could not be classified as anything other 
than a question of fact: was Galloway permanently and totally disabled by reason of mental illness as of 
May 31, 1919, or not?”). 
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
106 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
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with the result that “[c]ases that would have been decided by a jury under the 
common law are now dismissed by a judge under summary judgment.”107   
To be clear, the jury’s fact-finding powers have not been eliminated.  
We now have a legal regime in which judges also have fact-finding powers, 
and hence a system in which two institutions – judges and juries -- exercise 
fact-finding powers.  
4. The Lessons 
What lessons are to be drawn from federalism, separation of powers, 
and the relationship between judge and jury?  All are contexts where power is 
divided among multiple institutions as a structural mechanism for achieving 
effective governance while checking against tyranny-threatening  
concentrations of power.  To the extent that there is a structural analogy 
between these and church-state relations, as Garnett and other Separate 
Spherists plausibly have suggested,108 it is instructive to see that the 
architecture of separate spheres has not fared well.  Rather, initial 
expectations of separate spheres have given way to overlapping powers.  
Elsewhere I have fully explained the forces behind, and benefits of, 
the shift from separate spheres to overlapping powers in the separation of 
powers, federalism, and judge/jury contexts.109 These forces and benefits 
consist of pragmatic considerations,110 many of which transfer to the church-
state context.  This Article does not explore these, but provides in Parts III-
V a normative justification for overlapping powers that is distinctive to the 
realm of church-state relations. 
The final lesson from federalism, separation of powers, and the 
judge/jury relationship concerns conflict.  Overlapping powers opens the 
door to inter-institutional conflicts.  The history of overlapping powers in 
federalism, separation of powers, and between judge and jury shows that 
such conflicts can be successfully managed.111 Fear of conflict need not herd 
us into an embrace of Separate Spheres.     
107 Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 143 (2007). 
108 Garnett, supra note 51, at 10-11. 
109 See Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, supra note 83 at 1121-34.  
110 See id. (noting that overlapping powers can lead to greater efficiencies, allows tasks to be 
accomplished when one institution is paralyzed, can capture inter-institutional synergies, and may be 
necessary to address emergencies). 
111 See id. at 1135-40; Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 84, at 1717-31. 
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B. Republicanism 
In an important but undertheorized part of their article, Schragger 
and Schwartzman argue that Separate Spheres “clashes dramatically with our 
republican and democratic political commitments.”112  The argue as follows: 
Republicanism demands that the people, acting through their legislatures, 
constitute the sovereign.  It is skeptical of the exercise of unaccountable 
corporate power – whether by nobles, monopolies, labor unions, churches, 
universities, or cities.  In short, it does not tolerate corporate entities that 
operate outside of and in defiance of the state.  Group entities cannot 
constitute a separate law unto themselves.113 
I agree, but think it could be more fully justified argument.  The Religious 
Institution Principle does this.114  
C. Unavailing Arguments Against Separate Spheres  
 Schragger and Schwartzman propound three additional 
interconnected criticisms against Separate Spheres. They argue that (1) 
Separate Spherists have offered no principled way to determine what 
religious institutions aside from churches are deserving of protection,115 (2) 
religion is not unique, with the result that many other non-religious 
institutions also would have to receive protections if churches are,116 and (3) 
proponents of separate spheres have not offered principled limits to church 
freedom.117  These three arguments together generate a giant slippery slope: 
Separate Sphere’s lack of limits concerning what institutions receive 
protections and the scope of these protections would lead to large numbers 
of institutions that are independent of state control, which presumably would 
be undesirable and unworkable. 
 In  fact, some Separate Spherists have aimed to provide answers to 
each of Schragger and Schwartzman’s three critiques, though none has 
offered a systematic, internally consistent response.118  While I am uncertain 
112 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 22. 
113 Id. at 25-6. 
114 See infra Part III.A. 
115 See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 35 (noting that “a number of current-day religion 
clause battles revolve around competing characterizations of groups – around the question of whether 
a hospital, student group, a university, or an elementary school is a religious institution deserving of 
protection for religion clause purposes”).  
116 See id. at 31-37. 
117 See id. at 27-30. 
118 For instance, as to their first critique, Steve Smith has argued that only churches appropriately 
receive protection.  See x. As to the second, Rick Garnett has justified the special treatment accorded 
to religious institutions vis-à-vis non-religious institutions on grounds of constitutional text and history.  
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whether Separate Spheres has the conceptual resources to provide an 
internally consistent and normatively attractive response to these three 
critiques, the Religious Institution Principle does, as I will show below.119  
II. INDIVIDUALISM 
A. Description    
 The Individualism position, ably articulated by Schragger and 
Schwartzman, is that religious institutions do not have inherent autonomy, 
but only those rights that derive from the conscience and associational rights 
of their members.120  “[C]hurch autonomy is a function of individual 
autonomy,” claims Individualism, and “general principles of freedom of 
association, privacy, and conscience are sufficient to protect all conscience-
based associations, including churches.”121  It follows that churches do not 
have free exercise rights122 independent of their members, but can assert free 
exercise claims only if individual members of the church “have been 
burdened in their free exercise of religion.”123 
 As indicated above, I think Schragger and Schwartzman get it half 
right: the status of religious institutions does indeed derive from individuals, 
but religious institutions neither are reducible to their members nor are 
adequately protected by the concepts and doctrines that apply to people.  
This section critiques Individualism, while Parts III-IV construct my 
affirmative account of the Religious Institution Principle.  
B. Critique 
1. Inadequacies of the Lockean Justification 
 Schragger and Schwartzman ground Individualism on what they 
conclude to be the “best justification” for church autonomy, Locke’s 
position in the Letter on Toleration that churches are voluntary associations.124   
After first reviewing the Lockean argument on which they rely, this section 
provides three reasons why it cannot ground a general account of religious 
institutional autonomy in the modern era. 
See Garnett, supra note 51, at 30. Less attention has been paid to their third criticism, though Paul 
Horwitz has noted limit that Kuyper placed on churches and the other social spheres.  See Horwitz, 
supra note 10, at 111-13. 
119 See infra Parts III & IV. 
120 See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 5. 
121 Id. 
122 Or statutory rights under the RFRA or RLUIPA.  See supra note 3. 
123 Id. at 63. 
124 Id. at 38. 
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 Schragger and Schwartzman quote a crucial paragraph in the Letter on 
Toleration that provides a two-step argument for church autonomy.125  The 
first is an assumption concerning law’s necessity: every “society” -- by which 
Locke means any group of persons united by some interest, such as 
“philosophers for learning,” “merchants for commerce,” or a “church or 
company” --“will presently dissolve and break in pieces unless it be regulated 
by some law.”126  The second step is church-specific:  “since the joining 
together of several members into this church-society . . . is absolutely free 
and spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of making its laws can 
belong to none but the society itself; or, at least (which is the same thing), to 
those whom the society by common consent has authorized thereunto.”127   
According to Schragger and Schwartzman, the second step provides 
the conceptual justification for church autonomy.  As they explain it, the 
“grounding of church autonomy in voluntary association” means that 
churches have authority to rule not because they are “good, or benefit[] the 
wider society, or help[] individuals actualize themselves, but rather because it is a 
product of free association.  In other words, the institutional church – understood 
as a ‘voluntary society’ -- derives the right to choose, govern, and rule its own 
members from the voluntary nature of the association, i.e., from consent.” 128  
Throughout their article Schragger and Schwartzman shorthandedly refer to 
Locke’s justification for church autonomy as being based on 
“voluntarism,”129 and I shall call Locke’s second step the “Voluntarism 
Argument.”   
 There are three problems with relying on the Voluntarism Argument 
as a justification for church autonomy.  (As I soon explain, Schragger and 
Schwartzman may have abbreviated Locke’s full argument for church 
autonomy, which is relevant only to the third problem I identify). 
a. Contingency 
First, the Voluntarism Argument is factually contingent, and indeed is 
inconsistent with the many religions and individuals who do not 
conceptualize or experience the “joining together” of co-religionists into a 
church as “absolutely free and spontaneous.”130  Call this the “Empirical 
Critique” of the Voluntarism Argument.   
125 See id. at 41. 
126 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 16 (Mark Goldie, Ed.). 
127 Id. 
128 Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 41-42 (emphasis supplied). 
129 See, e.g., id. at 40.   
130 Schragger and Schwartzman themselves note this.  See id. at 39.  Though they think the challenge 
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But is the Empirical Critique empirically valid – are there individuals 
for whom, and religions for which, the Voluntarism Argument is 
inapplicable?  Most definitely yes.   For example, under Judaism’s self-
understanding, all human beings are commanded by God to observe God’s 
instructions.131  Furthermore, as to those who are born Jewish, there is no 
opt-in:  Jews are divinely “commanded” (in the words of the Bible132) to obey 
an extensive set of laws, which includes the duty to worship as part of a 
religious community.133  One of the paradigmatic marks of membership for 
males in the Jewish community – circumcision – is commanded by religious 
law to take place on the eighth day of life, which self-evidently is years before 
a child can consent to joining a community.134   Jewish Scriptures consistently 
premises a Jew’s obligation to obey God’s law on God’s historical act of 
redeeming the Israelites from Egypt.135  Moreover, there is no possibility of 
exit from the religious community on the self-understanding of Judaism.136  
And, finally, the conformance to religious command that Locke describes as 
being against conscience137 is thought by Judaism to be a habituating first 
step that can lead to ideal religious worship.138  All these crucial facets of 
Judaism are inconsistent with the voluntarism assumption.  While even one 
counterfactual suffices, Judaism is not the sole exception; much the same can 
be said of Islam.139  
“need[s] to be taken seriously,” they quickly conclude that “for our purposes their implications are 
limited [because t]he acceptance of a non-voluntarist conception of religious institutions if virtually 
unthinkable.”  Id. at 40.  Rawls helps us to see the problem with both Locke and Schwartzman and 
Schragger’s defense of Locke:  Locke’s account is premised on sectarian theological premises (i.e., only 
one of many “reasonable comprehensive views” in Rawls’ terminology), and the relevant question is 
whether a justification for church autonomy can be generated on the basis of a political (i.e., non-
comprehensive) view that all reasonable persons can plausibly be expected to accept. See RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at xvi.  This is precisely what Rawls aims to accomplish in 
“Political Liberalism,” see id., and what the Religious Institution Principle hopes to accomplish as well.   
131 See generally NAHUM RAKOVER, LAW AND THE NOAHIDES. 
132 See, e.g., DEUTERONOMY 6:17 (“You surely shall keep the commandments . . . that your God has 
commanded you”). 
133 See LEVITICUS 16:29-34 (reciting obligations pertaining to Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, 
applicable to “all Jews” for “all time”); EXODUS 12:14-15 (same as to Passover); Deuteronomy 5:26 
(speaking of an “eternal” obligation of the entire nation of Israel to “keep [God’s] commandments”). 
134 See GENESIS 16:9-14. 
135 See, e.g., DEUTERONOMY 6:12-25; id. 10:2-9. 
136 See generally Michael Gillette, Jewish Excommunication,  
http://www.chavurahmasarti.org/Spinoza.htm. 
137 See infra text and note 163. 
138 This concept is expressed by the phrase in Jewish law that “mitoch she lo leshma, ba le’shma,” which 
means “after initially performing the religious obligations without proper religious intent, the person 
will come to perform them with the appropriate religious intent.”  See BABYLONIAN TALMUD 
PESACHIM 50b.  It is used to explain why religious obligations must be performed even by a person 
who does not understand herself to be religiously obligated, or who does not understand the obligation 
to be a religious duty. 
139 See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION 1 (noting that “while religion is integral to 
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Locke’s voluntarism assumption is an artifact of his distinctive 
theological commitments, more specifically his Protestantism.  Voluntarism 
flows from the centrality of faith and conscience to Locke’s religious 
understandings.140 The commanded nature of membership and participation 
found in other religious traditions reflects the fact that conscience and 
consent function differently across religious:141 action can be religiously 
meaningful in the absence of faith or intent under these non-Protestant 
theologies, even as each deems religiously sincere action to be the highest form 
of religious activity.142         
 To be sure, the Empirical Critique does not devastate Locke’s 
argument, but only limits its applicability to religions that conceptualize 
churches in the voluntaristic fashion Locke describes.  But this limitation is 
important for two reasons.  First, it means that Locke’s account cannot 
provide a general justification for church autonomy in a religiously 
heterogeneous society.143  Locke’s voluntarism assumption applies to 
Protestants, and perhaps some other Christians. But assuming that these are 
not the only appropriate beneficiaries of church autonomy, the Lockean 
account is incomplete.  Second, because Locke’s account is premised on 
contestable theological premises, it cannot reasonably be expected to be 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens.144 
b. Limited Institutions to Which it Applies 
 There is a second respect in which the Voluntarism Argument has 
problematically limited scope: even as to those religions to which the  
voluntarism assumption is applicable, its protections extend only to 
institutions that have a “free and spontaneous” membership.  Locke says that 
the “church-society” so qualifies, but what else?   For instance, have 
employees of a religious hospital freely and spontaneously joined that 
institution?  Ambulance drivers, and the patients they transport?  Ambulatory 
patients in circumstances where no comparable medical care is available 
modern Western history, there are dangers in employing it as a normalizing concept when translating 
Islamic traditions”); SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY (providing detailed ethnographic study 
showing how liberal division between religion and state fails to map onto Islam). 
140 See infra note 160. 
141 The statement above in text is true for today’s religionists.  The fact that Judaism may believe that 
earlier generations consented to God’s laws, and that this consent is binding on subsequent 
generations, is fundamentally different from the individual consent Locke contemplates.   
142 See supra note 138. 
143 It should be noted that Locke understood that he was generating a justification that applied to a 
“Christian Commonwealth,” and recognized that other religions’ theological commitments led them to 
adopt a different relationship between religion and state.  See id. at 42 (explaining why “the Common-
wealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute Theocracy”).  
144 This is a Rawlsian criticism.  See supra note 130. 
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nearby?  Insofar as “free and spontaneous” is, for Locke, a proxy for  a 
person consenting to give coercive authority to the institution, the answer to 
most if not all these questions probably is “no.”   
 At this point in our discussion it is not yet possible to establish that 
such limited scope is normatively problematic; that requires a normative 
baseline that indicates what should be included, which must await Part III’s 
account of the Religious Institution Principle.  However, it is worth noting 
that Schragger and Schwartzman do not limit protections to churches.  For 
instance, when analyzing the contraception mandate, Schragger and 
Schwartzman do not say that Catholic hospitals are flatly beyond the scope 
of protection for the simple reason that they are not churches.145  There 
accordingly seems to be a disconnect between their approach and the 
Lockean ground on which they rely.     
c. Proves Either Nothing or Too Much 
 While the first and second critiques of Locke’s Voluntarism 
Argument provided above address the scope of the Lockean claim for 
church autonomy, the third critique presented now devastates the argument:  
the Lockean justification for church autonomy either (1) proves nothing or 
(2) proves too much by carrying unsettling implications that thereby 
undermine the argument’s validity. 
My claim that the Lockean justification simultaneously proves 
nothing or too much may sound puzzling, so let me explain.  I mentioned 
above that Schragger and Schwartzman treat the Voluntarism Argument as if 
it constituted the entirety of Locke’s argument for church autonomy, but that 
it may not.146  This section first shows that the Voluntarism Argument, on its 
own, cannot provide an adequate  justification for church autonomy (i.e., that 
it proves nothing).  But while my critique applies to Schragger and 
Schwartzman’s treatment of Locke’s argument, it may not apply to Locke’s full 
argument; Locke has the conceptual resources, beyond the paragraph in the 
Letter on Toleration relied on by  Schragger and Schwartzman,  for answering 
my critique of the Voluntarism Argument.  But Locke’s full justification for 
church autonomy runs into other profound difficulties:  it proves too much 
in the sense that it leads to problematic conclusions, thereby undermining the 
full argument’s validity.  As a result, neither Schragger and Schwartzman’s 
abbreviation of Locke, nor Locke’s full justification, provides a satisfactory 
account of church autonomy.    
145 See id. at 62. 
146 See supra text accompanying note 129. 
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i. Proves Nothing 
Locke states in the Letter on Toleration that because the joining 
together of members into a “church-society” is “absolutely free and 
spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of making its laws can belong to none 
but the society itself.”147    But how does it “necessarily follow[]” from the fact 
that a church is composed of (or created by) members who freely and 
spontaneously join together that “the right of making its laws can belong to 
none but the society itself”?  After all, why couldn’t individuals freely and 
spontaneously decide to join an already existing church, some of whose laws 
had been created in the past by the state?  Or, why couldn’t individuals freely 
and spontaneously decide to join an already existing church, with the 
knowledge that some of the church’s laws might be amended, or later 
created, by the state?  In short, who authors a church’s laws is logically 
independent of the voluntariness of joining that church.  Call this the 
“Voluntarism Critique.” 
The Voluntarism Critique remains valid even if the members of a 
church never consented to the state’s law, never delegated rule-making 
authority to the state, and at all times reject the legitimacy of a state-made 
law.  For example, polygamy was a central part of the early Mormon 
Church’s practice and theology, viewed as “a means to celestial glory.”148  
Congress banned polygamy in 1862, and the mainstream Mormon Church 
officially abandoned polygamy in 1890.149 During the 28 years between, did 
the fact that the government in effect made some of the Mormon Church’s 
laws by forbidding polygamy obviate the voluntariness of those individuals 
who decided to join the Mormon Church during that time?150  It is not at all 
obvious why it should.  If it did not – if, in other words, we are prepared to 
say that individuals voluntarily joined the church at a time when the state but 
not the church forbade polygamy -- then there is no necessary connection 
between an individual’s “free and spontaneous” joining of a church and the 
church’s “right of making its laws.”  Pace Locke, the latter does not 
“necessarily follow[]” from the former.  
The following response might be offered:  the state’s law forbidding 
polygamy did not constitute the church’s law – the polygamy prohibition at all 
times was simply the state’s law.  Accordingly, the Mormon example is not a 
147 LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16.   
148 See THOMAS F. O’DEA, THE MORMONS 60 (1957). 
149 See id. at 110-11.  
150 As explained below, Locke’s answer to this challenge is to say that polygamy falls within the 
exclusive domain of state regulatory authority, i.e., that it is not a matter of church law.  See infra text 
accompanying note 170.  I critique that solution below.  See id. at text and accompanying notes 166-
175.  Accepting my critique leaves one facing the objection raised above in text. 
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counter-example after all insofar as Locke’s conclusion – that “the right of 
making its laws can belong to none but the society itself” – was not violated.   
This response is logically sound; it reduces the Mormon example to a choice-
of-law problem in which state law applies but does not displace or rewrite 
church law.  But this response renders Locke’s church autonomy claim 
inconsequential:  it places no limits on what the state can do, apart from 
preventing the state from literally writing church law.  Once again, we are left 
with the conclusion that Locke’s argument effectively proves nothing vis-à-
vis church autonomy.   
ii. Proves too Much 
 While Schragger and Schwartzman reduce Locke’s church autonomy 
argument to “voluntarism,”151 and are vulnerable to the Voluntarism 
Critique, Locke’s theory of church autonomy may comprise an additional 
element that can answer the Voluntarism Critique.  For Locke, government 
only has the powers that it has been delegated by citizens’ consent, and 
certain powers are non-delegable to the state.  If Locke thought that religious 
matters were non-delegable to the state, then his response to the Voluntarism 
Critique would be as follows: (1) the state could not have made any of the 
religion’s laws in my examples above because the state could not have been 
delegated such powers and, therefore, (2) “the right of making its laws can 
belong to none but the [church] itself”152 pursuant to the powers delegated to 
the church by its consenting members.  These two propositions responding 
to the Voluntarism Critique together constitute a non-trivial argument for 
church autonomy.   
 In short, Locke’s argument for church autonomy is non-trivial only if 
the Voluntarism Argument is paired with what might be called the “State 
Non-Delegation Assumption” that the state cannot be delegated power to 
enact laws concerning religion.  I dub it the State Non-Delegation 
Assumption because it doesn’t imply that religious matters are categorically 
non-delegable – only that they cannot be delegated to the state (though, 
according to Locke, they can be delegated to churches). 
 Does Locke incorporate the State Non-Delegation Assumption?  
Almost certainly yes, as I shortly will show. But there is a rub: Locke’s 
assumption rests on a theory of Separate Spheres, i.e., the notion that there is 
151 See Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 40-41 (claiming that Locke’s Voluntarism 
Argument “provides the association with liberty from political constraints on its internal governance,” 
which “provides the basis for church autonomy.”). 
152 LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16. 
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a jurisdictional sphere that naturally belongs to religion and lies beyond the 
state.  
Three things emerge from this.  First, we can immediately understand 
why Schragger and Schwartzman disregard Locke’s State Non-Delegation 
Assumption; their entire article, after all, is a frontal attack on Separate 
Spheres.153  Second, as the Voluntarism Critique establishes, Locke’s 
argument for church autonomy becomes trivial without the State Non-
Delegation Assumption, rendering Schragger and Schwartzman’s 
reconstitution of Locke inadequate to the task of grounding meaningful 
church autonomy.   
Third, though the State Non-Delegation Assumption answers the 
Voluntarism Critique, the assumption fatally undermines Locke’s argument 
for church autonomy.  This is because Locke’s State Non-Delegation 
Assumption establishes a jurisdictional realm beyond state control.  This 
renders his full church autonomy an example of Separate Spheres, which 
accordingly must be rejected for the reasons explained above.154  (Indeed, 
analysis of Locke’s argument provides additional evidence of Separate 
Spheres’ inadequacy as political architecture.)  Stated formally: Locke’s full 
argument ‘proves too much’ by establishing a Separate Spheres realm of 
exclusive church jurisdiction, thereby undermining the full argument’s 
validity under the principle of propositional logic known as modus tollens.155   
But is Locke really a Separate Spherist? Yes.  In fact, carving out 
separate spheres for government and church lies at the core of Locke’s 
argument for toleration.  Locke begins the Letter on Toleration by explaining 
that he “esteem[s] it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the 
Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just 
Bounds that lie between the one and the other.”156  As to the state, Locke 
tells us that “the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to these 
civil Concernments; and that all Civil Power, Right, and Dominion is 
bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things” – by 
which Locke means “the just Possession of these things belonging to this 
Life” --  “and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to 
the Salvation of Souls.”157  By contrast, “[t]he end of a Religious Society .  . . 
153 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 6-36. 
154 See supra Part I.B-C. 
155 Under modus tollens, if P implies Q, and Q is false, then P also is false. See generally VIRGINIA KLENK, 
UNDERSTANDING SYMBOLIC LOGIC.  For present purposes, P is Locke’s full argument for church 
autonomy, and the (false) Q it implies is that “the right of making its laws can belong to none but the 
[church] itself,” i.e., Separate Spheres.  LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16. 
156 LOCKE, supra note 126, at 12. 
157 Id. at 12-13.  Locke famously believed that civil government’s role was quite limited.  See id. at 46.  
                                                   
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                28 
 
is the Publick Worship of God, and by means thereof the acquisition of 
Eternal Life.  All discipline ought therefore to tend to that End, and all 
Ecclesiastical Laws to be thereunto confined.  Nothing ought, nor can be 
transacted in this Society, relating to the Possession of Civil and Worldly 
Goods.”158   
Interestingly – and revealing once again the sectarian character of 
Locke’s argument159 -- Locke justifies the separateness of the religious and 
civil spheres on the theological ground that meaningful religious acts must be 
done according to one’s conscience, not compulsion.  “All the life and Power 
of true Religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind:  And 
Faith is not Faith without believing.”160 From this it follows that “[i]n vain 
therefore do Princes compel their Subjects to come into their Church-
communion, under pretense of saving their Souls.  If they believe, they will 
come of their own accord; if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail 
them.”161 Indeed, Locke goes so far as to say that religious acts undertaken 
pursuant to state compulsion “far from being any furtherance, are indeed 
great Obstacles to our Salvation,”162 and that for a state to command its 
citizens to religious worship “in effect [is] to command them to offend 
God.”163  Continues Locke, “[a]s the magistrate has no power to impose by his 
Limited state jurisdiction may have made separate jurisdictional spheres more possible than what is 
possible in today’s world of more extensive governmental regulation.  This would constitute a reason 
for questioning the degree to which Locke’s approach can be applied today.  The discussion above in 
text shows, however, that Locke’s Separate Spheres approach was problematic even under his 
assumption of limited civil jurisdiction. 
158 Id. at 18. 
159 Consistent with the observation above that conscience and voluntarism play different roles in 
Protestantism than in Judaism and Islam, the idea that religion cannot by its nature be the subject of 
the state’s law is a sectarian --most certainly not a universal – perspective.  Judaism and Islam have no 
analogue of Luke’s distinction between God and Caesar, and their Scriptures permit, and histories 
include, state exercise of religious authority.  See, e.g.,  ASAD, supra note 139, at 205-36 (contrasting 
“the forcible redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identify as personal 
matters that belong to the newly emerging space of private (as opposed to public) life” in Christian 
Europe with the Islamic concept of umma, “a religious-political space . . . within which rational 
discussion, debate, and criticism can be conducted.  It is also a space of power and of punishment”). 
160 Id. at 13; see also id. at 14 (“The care of the Salvation of Mens Souls cannot belong to the 
Magistrate; because, though the rigour of Laws and the force of Penalties were capable to convince and 
change Mens minds, yet would not that help at all to the Salvation of their Souls”); see also id. (“For 
laws are of no force at all without Penalties, and Penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent; 
because they are not proper to convince the mind.”); id. at 31 (“No way whatsoever that I shall walk in, 
against the Dictates of my Conscience, will every bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed.  I may grow 
rich by an Art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some Disease by Remedies that I have not 
Faith in; but I cannot be saved by a Religion that I distrust, and by a Worship that I abhor.  It is in vain 
for an Unbeliever to take up the outward shew of another Mans Profession.  Faith only, and inward 
Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God.”).  
161 Id. at 32. 
162 Id. at 13. 
163 Id. at 33. 
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laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any church, so neither has he any 
power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received, 
approved, and practiced by any church; because, if he did so, he would 
destroy the church itself . . .”164 
In short, it is the jurisdictional distinctiveness between civil and 
religious matters that is the foundation of Locke’s argument for “toleration,” 
by which Locke means that the state should not regulate matters that fall 
within the realm of religion.165 “[T]herefore,” concludes Locke, “when all is 
done, [men] must be left to their own Consciences” regarding religion’s 
domain.166  In light of the theological presuppositions that give rise to 
Locke’s Separate Spheres theory, it is likely that he embraced the State Non-
Delegation Assumption, according to which religious matters simply could 
not be delegated to the state insofar as they fall outside of government’s 
competency.   
Predictably, the problems that attend Separate Spheres explained in 
the previous section167 are on full display in Locke.  Separate Spheres requires 
that activities be placed in one, but only one, sphere.168  Locke concludes that 
matters concerning the “Publick good” fall within the state’s realm.169  
Though he unsurprisingly concludes that polygamy and divorce implicate the 
public good, and accordingly can be regulated by the state, it surely would be 
surprising to many religions (say Mormonism and Catholicism) to be told 
that polygamy and divorce are not religious matters.  Yet this is what Locke 
concludes.170  Surely it is more plausible to say that polygamy and divorce 
164 Id. at 37 (emphasis in original). 
165 Id. at 26.  As indicated above, Locke also discusses the toleration that should be exercised by private 
individuals, see id. at 20, and churches, see id. at 19-20.   
166 Id. at 32. 
167 See supra Part I.B-I.C. 
168 At one point deep into the Letter Locke appears to acknowledge jurisdictional overlap when he 
concedes that “[m]oral actions” concerns both “Religion [and] also the Commonwealth.”  Id. at 45.  
But he quickly reverts to his Separate Spheres framework, averring that “if what has been already said 
concerning the Limits of both these Governments be rights considered, it will easily remove all 
difficulty in this matter” so that neither of the two “Jurisdictions intrench upon the other . . .”  Id.  
Continues Locke, “[f]or the Political Society is instituted for no other end but only to secure every 
mans Possession of the things of this life.  The care of each mans Soul, and of the things of Heaven, 
which neither does belong to the Commonwealth, nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every 
mans self.”  Id. at 48.  Locke’s confident assertion here in no way solves the problem that he himself 
recognizes. 
169 Id. at 34. 
170 Locke concludes that the state has jurisdiction over “indifferent things.” See id. at 33.  Locke 
differentiates between, on the one hand, “[t]hings in their own nature indifferent,” which he says 
“cannot, by any human Authority, be made any part of the Worship of God . . . because they are 
indifferent,” and, on the other hand, “[t]hings never so indifferent in their own nature,” which, “when 
they are brought into the Church and Worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the 
Magistrate’s Jurisdiction.”  See id. at 33-34.  As a consequence of Locke’s understanding of indifferent 
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implicate both the state’s and religion’s interests.  But Locke’s Separate 
Spheres framework does not allow for such a conclusion. 
Further evidence of Separate Spheres’ weakness is that, when 
confronting concrete hard cases, Locke abandons the Separate Spheres that 
grounded his argument for toleration.  For instance, though a church’s rituals 
might include child sacrifice, Locke concludes that the state can ban the 
practice.171  But because Separate Spheres provided the conceptual grounds 
for Locke’s argument for toleration, he has no resources for explaining why 
the overlapping jurisdiction, and conflict, between state and church should 
be resolved as he claims.  Locke instead falls back on a conclusory assertion 
that “those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their 
ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things ought not to 
be permitted to churches in their sacred rites.”172  
This merits two critical observations.  First, given Locke’s conception 
of the church, why wouldn’t the state ban have the effect of “destroy[ing] the 
church itself”?173  Locke doesn’t tell us.174  Second, if Locke really means to 
abandon Separate Spheres, and instead to embrace the proposition that the 
state can proscribe church rituals that the state deems to be “prejudicial to 
the commonweal of a people in their ordinary use,”175 then we are left once 
again with the previous subsection’s conclusion that Lockean church 
autonomy doesn’t amount to much at all.  And, indeed, at this point in the 
Letter the best Locke can do is to caution that the magistrate be “very careful 
that he does not misuse his authority to the oppression of any church, under 
pretense of public good.”176 
To quickly summarize, Locke’s argument for church autonomy fails 
for one of two reasons:  it is either trivial because it proves too little, or it 
proves too much by establishing a church realm that is utterly beyond state 
things, all matters, at any given point in time, fall into either the magistrate’s or religion’s sphere. Locke  
concludes that polygamy and divorce are indifferent things, see JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
TOLERATION II, at 110, thereby placing them outside the church’s realm and into the exclusive sphere 
of the magistrate.    
171 Id. at 37.  Locke also states that “if some congregations should have a mind to . . . lustfully pollute 
themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practice any other such heinous enormities,” the state can 
ban these things because “[t]hese things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private 
house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God, or in any religious meeting.”  Id.     
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 37. 
174 Similarly, Locke acknowledges that slaughter of an animal can be a religious ritual, but nonetheless 
concludes that the state can ban slaughter “for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of 
cattle that had been destroyed by some extraordinary” disease.  Id. 
175 Id. at 37. 
176 Id. 
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regulatory authority.  Either way, Locke cannot provide an adequate 
grounding for church autonomy.  An alternative framework is required. 
2. Under-Protects  
A second problem with Individualism is that it under-protects 
religious institutions.  Because identifying what constitutes under-protection 
requires a normative baseline that indicates the proper level of protection, I 
shall delay explanation of this shortcoming until after developing my 
affirmative account of religious institution autonomy.177  
III. THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION PRINCIPLE  
 This Part III derives what I call the “Religious Institution Principle 
Principle” from Rawls’ political theory and fleshes out its contents.  Part IV 
identifies limitations on the Religious Institution Principle that flow from 
other parts of Rawls’ theory.  Part V anticipates, and responds to, several 
difficult challenges that might be posed to the Religious Institution Principle. 
A. The Original Position 
 John Rawls’s project in Political Liberalism is to describe the basic 
structure of a stable and enduring democratic constitutional regime that can 
win the wholehearted support of a citizenry having a plurality of 
incompatible, yet reasonable, comprehensive religious, philosophical and 
moral doctrines.178 Rawls famously elucidates the basic structure of political 
society using the heuristic device of the “original position.” Under the 
original position, people are to identify the fair political structure by 
conceiving themselves as being under a “veil of ignorance” under which they 
“do not know the social position, or the conception of the good (its 
particular aims and attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological 
propensities, and much else, of the persons they represent.” 179 Because 
the parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the 
persons they represent is a majority or a minority view ... [t]hey 
cannot take chances by permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to 
minority religions, say, on the possibility that those they represent 
espouse a majority or dominant religion and will therefore have an 
even greater liberty. For it may also happen that these persons 
belong to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly. If the parties 
were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take 
the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons 
seriously, and, in effect, did not know what a religious, 
177 See infra Part III.E.2(b). 
178 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at xvi.  The next three paragraphs draw from Rosen, 
Outer Limits, supra note 26, at 1090-91. 
179 Id. at 305. 
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philosophical, or moral conviction was.180  
The veil of ignorance is a heuristic for enabling people to transcend 
their self-interests so as to identify a fair (and hence just) political structure. 
The veil of ignorance aims to transform personal self-interest into society-
wide interest: People in the original position choose a political structure that 
maximally accommodates everybody’s religious, philosophical and moral 
convictions because they do not know whom they actually represent, and 
accordingly do not want to risk creating a polity that did not accommodate 
whomever it is they happened to represent. 
 It follows that people in the original position would not select a 
political structure that might preclude themselves from living in accordance 
with their religious, philosophical or moral convictions. In Rawls’s words, 
allowing autonomy for only select persons’ conceptions of the good would 
constitute a “gamble [that would] show that [the person in the original 
position] did not take the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of 
persons seriously and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, 
or moral conviction was.”181  
 More specifically, Rawls concludes that people in the original position 
would agree upon two principles of justice that determine society’s political 
institutions.  Only the first is relevant for present purposes.  It provides that 
“[e]ach person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”182 
“The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and so 
on). . . are the background institutional conditions necessary for the 
development and the full informed exercise of the two moral powers,”183 one 
of which is the capacity to formulate a conception of the good.184  
Rawls’ first principle of justice is stated at a high level of abstraction.  
What concretely does it call for?  To begin, Rawls understands that there are 
multiple institutional arrangements that are consistent with the principles of 
justice for two reasons.  First, there are differences across societies – in terms 
of population, history, and geography – such that an institutional 
arrangement that satisfies the principles of justice in one society might not in 
another.  Second, even within a single society, there may be multiple 
institutional arrangements that would be consistent with the principles of 
180 Id. at 311 (emphasis supplied). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 291. 
183 Id. at 308. 
184 Id. at 19. 
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justice.   For these two reasons, Rawls’ theory does not demand a single set 
of institutional arrangements. 
But Rawls’ theory would have only limited utility if its guidance  
ended there.  Importantly, Rawls describes a four stage process by which 
people can draw on the principles of justice to generate substantially detailed 
institutional arrangements for their society.  “Each stage is to represent an 
appropriate point of view from which certain kinds of questions are 
considered.”185    The first stage is the above described veil of ignorance, 
which generates the two principles of justice.  In each subsequent stage the 
veil is “partially lifted” until, at stage four “everyone has complete access to 
all facts.”186 In the second stage, which Rawls calls the “constitutional 
convention,” parties “now know the relevant general facts about their 
society, that is, its natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic 
advance and political culture, and so on.”187  At the second stage, people thus 
know the size of their society’s population as well as the degree of its 
heterogeneity, including “a knowledge of the beliefs and interests that men in 
the system are liable to have and of the political tactics that they will find it 
rational to use given their circumstances.”188  Though this is a significant 
amount of culture-specific and time-specific information, Rawls plausibly 
insists that “[p]rovided they have no information about particular individuals 
including themselves, the idea of the original position” – by which he means 
its ability to serve as a heuristic in the design of society’s institutions -- “is not 
affected.”189 Rawls calls the third the “legislative stage,”190 and the fourth the 
“administrative stage.”   
When I use the original position to infer specific institutional 
arrangements, I sometimes will be operating at the first stage, frequently at 
the second, and occasionally the third.  Differentiating between the stages is 
not important for the purely internal purpose of determining what 
contemporary American institutions should be like insofar as “the idea of the 
original position is not affected” so long as the persons in the original 
position do not know the specific people they represent.191   Differentiating 
between the first and subsequent stages is important, however, to distinguish 
185 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 196. 
186 Id. at 197, 199; see also RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 48 (“Limitations on 
knowledge available to the parties are progressively relaxed in the next three stages”).   
187 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 197.   
188 Id. at 198. 
189 Id. 
190 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 48. 
191 Id. 
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between conclusions that apply to all liberal polities and those that are 
specific to the United States.192      
B. Preliminary Statement of the Religious Institution Principle 
 The first principle of justice has important implications for religious 
institutions. For many people, the freedom to develop and fully exercise a 
conception of the good requires that they be able to live in accordance with 
their religious convictions, which in turn presupposes the existence of certain 
religious institutions. The political structure chosen under the original 
position accordingly would be one that afforded such religious institutions 
special protections.  
 How extensive would those protections be?  My basic conclusion is 
this:   
A person in the original position, not knowing whether she 
represents a non-religious person, a religious person who belongs 
to a majority religion, or a religious person who belongs to a 
minority religion, would not consent to a political structure that 
had the power to prevent her religion’s religious institutions from 
doing what is necessary, from the internal perspective of the 
religious community, for its adherents to develop and fully exercise 
the religion’s conception of the good.    
I call this the “Religious Institution Principle.” After clarifying the Religious 
Institution Principle in the rest of this subpart, the Article works out the 
principle’s important implications in today’s United States.    
  1. “what is necessary” 
 The Religious Institution Principle’s presumptive protections extend 
to “what is necessary” for a religion’s adherents.  Two objections may be 
posed.  First, it might be objected that this turns the Religious Institution 
Principle into a null set for any religion that believes it has benefitted from 
adversity, including confrontational relations with secular authorities.193  For 
example, the biblical figure Joseph explained his kidnapping and 
imprisonment as divinely guided events that ultimately led him to becoming 
the second in command in Egypt, allowing him to save the Jewish and 
Egyptian people from famine.194  The Jewish community has similarly 
understood painful historical periods (such as exile from the land of Israel 
two thousand years ago, the Spanish Inquisition, and even the Holocaust) as 
192 Differentiating among the stages also is relevant to determining what contemporary American 
institutional features could justifiably be altered as society shifts over time.  
193 I am grateful to Steve Smith for raising this point. 
194 See GENESIS 44:4-8. 
                                                   
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                35 
 
part of a divine plan,195 and Mormons have similarly conceptualized the 
persecutions they suffered.196   
More generally, the “nullity challenge” can be formulated as follows: 
from the perspective of a religion that believes in divine providence, nothing 
can be said to be “necessary” from the political authorities.  Whatever 
happens is divinely guided, and the religion’s adherents will be able to cope, 
and may even be better off for it.  
 The nullity challenge is readily answered. The fact that a religion has 
the theological resources to explain disasters   ex post does not mean that the 
religion voluntarily invites disasters ex ante.  The original position concerns ex 
ante decision-making:  what political arrangements would individuals think it 
fair to select, not knowing whom they actually represent?  I know of no 
religion that advises its adherents to opt for persecution.  It is only in relation 
to such a religion, if any exists, that the nullity challenge would be valid, and 
partial validity would not undermine the Religious Institution Principle’s valid 
application in respect of all other religions. 
 Having disposed of the nullity challenge, let us proceed to consider 
the contents of the Religious Institution Principle’s “necessity” requirement.  
To begin, there is an ambiguity:  does necessary mean ‘merely useful’, or   
‘indispensable’ in the sense that without it an adherent would be unable to 
develop and fully exercise her religion’s conception of the good?197  The 
answer likely turns on basic facts of the society in question, and hence is 
answerable only at Rawls’ second stage.  In the large heterogeneous society 
that is contemporary America, the Religious Institution Principle’s necessity 
requirement can extend only to protecting what is indispensable.  
Interpreting necessity to include what is “useful” would be too costly, and 
would lead to too many problematic conflicts with the legitimate interests of 
non-religious citizens.  More on this soon.198   
 This leads to the second possible objection to the Religious 
Institution Principle’s necessity requirement:  is it under-protective?  Put 
differently, why would a person in the original position, knowing that she 
might represent a religious person, agree to the Religious Institution 
Principle, insofar as it provides only the minimal protections as to what was 
indispensable for religious adherents’ self-realization?  It is best to address 
195 See generally ELIEZER BERKOVITZ, FAITH AFTER THE HOLOCAUST. 
196 See, e.g., Ronald E. Poelman, Adversity and the Divine Purpose of Mortality, ENSIGN, at 23 (May 1989). 
197 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-14 (1819). 
198 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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this important question later, after having fully worked out the Religious 
Institution Principle’s contents.199  
2. “from the internal perspective of the religious community” 
 Under the Religious Institution Principle, necessity is determined  
from the religious community’s internal perspective.200  This “Internal 
Perspective” requirement follows from the veil of ignorance: a person in the 
original position, not knowing whether she represented a person belonging 
to a majority or minority religion, would not agree to allowing what is 
religiously necessary to be determined by the societal majority, which might 
have different religious understandings. 
 The Internal Perspective requirement carries a second important 
implication:  what matters is the perspective of the religion’s formal leaders, 
not its lay members.  The principle presupposes the continued existence of 
necessary religious institutions, and religious institutions can survive only if 
the formal leaders’ understandings of the institution’s requirements are 
determinative.201  So long as dissenters are free to exit from one church and 
join (or establish) another – a requirement  discussed below202 – people in the 
original position accordingly would agree that the religion’s formal leaders 
determine the  religion’s internal perspective.203   
199 See infra Part V.C. 
200 This is consistent with what has come to be known as the church autonomy doctrine.  See Watson 
v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 727 (1872) (stating that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or 
ecclesiastic rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which 
the matter has been carried, the [state’s] legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final . . .”); see 
also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952) (speaking of the power of “religious organizations” to “decided for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”).  
201 This can be satisfied by a rule that gave weight to lay sensibilities, so long as such a rule of 
recognition were identified by the institution’s leaders.  More generally, religious institutions require 
law, cf. LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16, law presupposes a rule of recognition, see H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 100-110 (1961), and a non-governmental institution’s rule of recognition must come 
from its formal leaders, or else law and the institution will “dissolve and break in pieces.” LOCKE, supra 
note 126, at 16.      
202 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
203 This does not mean that society must automatically accept whatever it is that one of the institution’s 
spokespersons says is its internal perspective.  Absolute deference to the institution’s spokesperson 
would not be selected in the original position because such a rule self-evidently would be liable to 
abuse by religious institutions, and for that reason could not be generalized as a rule that would be 
applicable to all religions (as all rules chosen in the original position must be).  Accordingly, 
government necessarily must be involved in determining what constitutes the religious institution’s 
internal perspective for purposes of the Religious Institution Principle.  A rule of absolute deference to 
the “deci[sions] by the highest of the[] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried” is one 
possibility.  See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.  A full exploration of how government is to determine the 
religion’s internal perspective is an important question that lies beyond this Article’s scope. 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 I shall now proceed to a discussion of several of the many 
implications that flow from the Religious Institution Principle.   
C. What Counts as a Religious Institution? 
What counts as a ‘religious institution’ for purposes of the Religious 
Institution Principle?  The guiding criterion is whether a particular institution 
is necessary, from the religion’s internal perspective, for its adherents to fully 
develop and exercise their conception of the good.  Churches, synagogues, 
and mosques readily qualify.   
1. What Does Not:  Against the Slippery Slope 
Before considering what other institutions might qualify as religious 
institutions, it will be helpful to clarify some that would not.  Illuminating in 
its own right, this discussion also provides a  response to one of Schragger 
and Schwartzman’s arguments, referred to above,204 against the proposition 
that churches deserve “a special constitutional status.”205 Though directed to 
Separate Spherists, their argument also applies to the Religious Institution 
Principle since it too grants religious institutions special protections.   
Schragger and Schwartzman cite Robert Putnam for the proposition 
that “there do not appear to be decisive differences between churches, 
bowling leagues, and coffee houses.”206  After initially qualifying this 
equivalence,207 Schragger and Schwartzman conclude “it is extraordinarily 
problematic to recognize and distinguish some conscience-based 
organizations over others” and that “[a]s a matter of political theory, such a 
distinction violates a central principle of equality.”208  This equivalence is the 
ground for two conclusions that are crucial to their position.  First, is their 
slippery slope conclusion that churches cannot be given special protection; 
protecting churches, they suggest, would demand that special protections 
also be granted to all these other  organizations as well, an impossibility on 
pragmatic and normative grounds.  Second is their doctrinal conclusion that  
churches should be treated interchangeably with the Boy Scouts, political 
parties, and newspapers; they assimilate churches into the doctrinal categories 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 115-117. 
205 Schragger and Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 5.   
206 Id. at 35 & n. 154.   
207 See id. at 35 (“It is certainly possible that religious institutions are sociologically significant – akin to 
state, market, and family as an organizing principle of social life” such that “our lives may revolve 
around churches to such a degree that they are deserving of special treatment.”). 
208 Id. at 36. 
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of freedom of association and expressive association that govern these other 
institutions, and conclude that religious institutions are entitled to no 
additional constitutional protections.209   
The Religious Institution Principle, however, provides a basis for 
distinguishing among these institutions. What matters is whether an 
institution is viewed by participants in the original position, or those at the 
second stage, as being part of the “background institutional conditions 
necessary for the development and the full informed exercise of” a 
conception of the good.210  While some non-religious institutions may 
qualify,211 most of Schragger and Schwartzman’s examples would not – it is 
inconceivable that bowling leagues, the Boy Scouts, or newspapers would 
count, and political parties probably also would not. So while Schragger and 
Schwartzman might be correct that churches are “not unique,”212 their 
argument that treating churches specially would entail extending the same 
protections to all these other institutions is answerable from Rawls’ 
perspective. 
 The Religious Institution Principle sheds light on another criticism 
propounded by Schwartzman and Schragger.  They assert that religious 
institutionalists must “claim not only that religion is good but that organized 
religion facilitates, promotes, or is constitutive of that good.”213 Not so from 
Rawls’ social contractarian perspective.  What matters is not the truth of 
whether religion is good (and the truth of organized religion’s connection to 
that good), but the likely perception of the person behind the veil of ignorance 
(or at the second stage) who participates in the original position; the person 
behind the veil recognizes that she might be religious, so the truth of 
religion’s relation to goodness is not relevant.  Stated differently, what 
matters is the empirical (rather than ontological) question of whether 
religious persons in the society that is the object of the original position or 
second stage think religious institutions are necessary for their religious 
flourishing.  The answer certainly is “yes” for people in today’s United States.     
209 As to freedom of association, Schragger and Schwartzman state that Boy Scouts and Hosanna-Tabor 
“appear to be justified by a similar set of arguments and are grounded in a similar concern for freedom 
of conscience.”  See id. at 56.  As to expressive associations, Schartzman and Schragger argue against 
church exemption from labor laws on the ground that “[t]here is no reason that firms or corporations 
with expressive or conscientious missions (for example newspapers or political parties) cannot also 
offer good reasons to be immune from employment laws.”  Id. at 59. 
210 Id. at 19. 
211 As explained later, the Religious Institution Principle does not negate the possibility of what might 
be called a “Non-Religious Institution Principle.”  See infra Part V.D.1. 
212 Id. at 30. 
213Id. (emphasis in original). 
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2. Beyond Churches 
So what institutions beyond churches, synagogues and mosques 
would count as religious institutions?   
a. Educational Institutions 
 To begin, some educational institutions almost certainly would be 
included, though difficult questions quickly arise.  The Religious Institution  
principle requires the existence of institutions that allow for the formulation 
of a conception of the good, and while this undoubtedly demands some 
educational autonomy for religious groups,214 it does not automatically follow 
that there must be separate parochial schools for each religion’s children, or 
religious universities for its young adults.  If a religion does not believe that 
separate schools are necessary for its adherents to develop and live in 
accordance with the religion’s conception of the good, then schools are not a 
religious institution for that religion.  
b. The “Differentiated Approach” 
This suggests that what counts as a religious institution may vary 
across religions, on the reasonable assumption that different religions have 
differing understandings of what institutions are necessary for their adherents 
to flourish.  Call this the ‘Differentiated Approach’ to identifying religious 
institutions.  It might be thought that the Differentiated Approach 
constitutes a floor, not a ceiling, meaning that a state could conclude that all 
religions should be treated equally for purposes of identifying religious 
institutions.215  Call this the ‘Undifferentiated Approach.’   
Though counterintuitive, the first principle of justice requires the 
Differentiated Approach in societies with heterogeneous populations.  As 
explained later, there are legitimate limits on the degree to which justice 
requires that a liberal state accommodate the needs of religious groups, one 
of which is political stability.216  Now consider this:  it is conceivable that (1) 
one religion could, from its internal perspective, require a particular 
institution that no other religions need, and that (2) accommodating that 
particular religious institution would be consistent with political stability only 
in small doses, i.e., that accommodating the religious institution would not be 
possible if like accommodations had to be extended to all religions.  This 
214 See Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26. 
215It is not hard to imagine arguments for the Undifferentiated Approach.  It might be thought that the 
Differentiated Approach is fundamentally unfair because it treats different religions differently, or that 
the Undifferentiated Approach is administratively simpler.  
216 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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shows that the Undifferentiated Approach unnecessarily limits the range of 
religions that could be accommodated in the liberal society.  This possibility 
would lead people in an original position to reject the Undifferentiated 
Approach because it might mean that the person they represent would not be 
able to realize her conception of the good. The Differentiated Approach to 
determining what counts as a religious institution is preferable, in other 
words, because it expands the range of citizens with reasonable 
comprehensive views that the liberal state can accommodate, thereby 
increasing the extent to which the first principle of justice can be realized.  
  c.     Hospitals and Economic Enterprises 
Let us return to the question of what if any institutions apart from 
churches and (some) educational institutions may qualify as a religious 
institution from the religion’s Internal Perspective.  Some religions (Judaism 
and Islam, for example) have highly developed systems of courts and 
business law.217  Does the Religious Institution Principle demand that they be 
allowed to function as parallel, independent legal systems outside of the 
state’s contract and business law?  No. Both Judaism and Islam have the 
functional equivalent of choice-of-law rules that permit religious contract and 
business law to be displaced by state law.218 As such, it cannot be said that, 
from these religions’ internal perspectives, their systems of contract law are 
necessary for their adherents to live in accordance with their conception of 
the good.  Accordingly, their courts and business law would not qualify as 
religious institutions.   
To be clear, this conclusion does not mean it would be wrongful for 
a state to accommodate them, as the United States currently does by allowing 
religious tribunals to resolve disputes pursuant to religious law among people 
who voluntarily submit to their jurisdiction and then allowing state 
mechanisms to help enforce the tribunals’ judgments.219  From the 
perspective of the Religious Institution Principle, however, this is a policy 
choice, not a requirement of the first principle of justice.  
Would hospitals qualify as religious institutions?  The answer turns 
on whether religious hospitals are necessary, from the religion’s internal 
217 See generally SHULCHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat; Mohammad Fadel, Islamic and American Law:  
Between Concordance and Dissonance, 57 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 231, 232-36 (2012-2013). 
218 See, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, The Role of Secular Law in Halakha:  A Brief Response to Gerald Blidstein and 
a Note on Jewish Legal Theory, 2 MEOROT 6, 10 (2008) (treating the Jewish legal category of dina 
de’malchuta dina as a choice-of-law provision); Fadel, supra note 217, at 236-37 (discussing “treaty” 
approach to legal obligations of Muslims who live in non-Muslim majority countries). 
219 See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal 
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). 
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perspective, for its adherents to fully develop and exercise their conception 
of the good.  This question probably is most pressing vis-à-vis Catholicism.  
While I am not in a position to answer it from that tradition’s internal 
perspective, a few observations can be made.  Even assuming that “service 
lies at the core” of Catholicism,220 need service be provided in a religious 
hospital (or in a religious social service organization)?  On the one hand, the 
religious individual may equally be able to provide service in a public 
hospital, and thereby fulfill her vocational calling.  On the other hand, the 
religion might understand the provision of service through a religiously 
identified organization to be a necessary means of providing witness of God 
to the world. An internal perspective of this sort would suggest that the 
hospital (or other social service organization) is a religious institution for that 
religion, under the Differentiation Approach.  Under this logic, some 
corporations also may qualify as religious institutions.221 
D. Overlapping Spheres 
Even if a Catholic hospital (or other organization) qualified as a 
religious institution, that would not mean that governmental regulation of 
that institution (for instance the contraception mandate) necessarily would be  
wrongful, for two reasons.  First, as explained immediately below in Section 
E, the Religious Institution Principle does not protect religious institutions 
from all laws, but has finite “coverage.”  Second, as explained in the next 
Part IV, even as to those laws to which the Religious Institution Principle 
applies, its protections are not absolute.  For these two reasons, the Religious 
Institution Principle does not generate a political architecture of Separate 
Spheres in which religious institutions are jurisdictionally separate from, or 
otherwise independent of, the government.  Instead, the Religious Institution 
Principle leads to a system of overlap between government and religious 
institutions.  
E.     Coverage:  The Scope of Presumptive Protections 
1. Why Many Laws Fall outside the Principle’s Coverage 
The scope of the laws to which the Religious Institution Principle 
extends is determined by the logic that gives rise to the principle:  the 
principle’s coverage extends only to laws that threaten to disable religious 
institutions from facilitating adherents’ abilities to develop and live in 
accordance with the religion’s conception of the good. Most governmental 
laws do not, and for that reason do not fall within the Religious Institution 
220 Berg, supra note 15, at 5. 
221 See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 15.  
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Principle’s coverage.  This is true, for instance, of tax laws, and most labor 
and zoning laws.222 More generally, the Religious Institution Principle does 
not protect religious institutions from governmental laws that address 
behaviors about which a religion does not take a position, or laws that 
prohibit behavior that the religion also proscribes (such as sexual abuse).   
The only caveat is this:  the Religious Institution Principle would be triggered 
if such laws were administered in a way that undermined the institution’s 
ability to facilitate adherents’ development and living in accord with the 
religion’s conception of the good.  For instance, while tax laws are not per se 
problematic, an excessive tax that risked bankrupting religious institutions 
would come under the Religious Institution Principle’s coverage.   
Perhaps surprisingly, the Religious Institution Principle does not 
extend to laws simply because they are contrary to the religion’s 
commitments.  Instead, the principle applies only if the law’s application 
threatens to undermine the institution’s capability of facilitating adherents’ 
ability to formulate and live in accordance with the religion’s conception of 
the good.  This has particular relevance to the contraception mandate.  
Assume for present purposes that Catholic hospitals are religious institutions. 
The relevant question for determining the scope of the Religious Institution 
Principle’s coverage is not whether Catholicism supports the use of 
contraception.  Instead, the question is whether a Catholic hospital’s 
compliance with a law requiring that they provide their employees with 
insurance covering contraception undermines the role hospitals play in 
facilitating Catholics’ abilities to formulate and live in accordance with 
Catholicism’s conception of the good.  While fully answering this question 
from an internal Catholic perspective lies beyond this Article’s scope, this 
much can be said:  it is not self-evident that the contraception mandate come 
within the Religious Institution Principle’s coverage.      
Importantly, coverage is not a function of individual conscience, the 
institution’s “conscience,”223 or members’ free exercise claims.224  This is not 
to suggest that the Religious Institution Principle displaces an individual’s 
free exercise claim; it does not.225  But free exercise should not be run 
222 To be clear, the first principle of justice does not indicate that exemptions from these sorts of laws 
(for example tax exemptions for clergy) are unjust, just that they are not required as a matter of first 
principles.   
223 In a characteristically thoughtful and carefully reasoned piece, Kent Greenawalt analyzes religious 
institutional autonomy using the paradigm of conscience.  See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Tolerance and 
Claims of Conscience (draft on file with author). Such an approach is in tension with the Religious 
Institution Principle for the reasons explained above. 
224 Pace Schragger and Schwartzman, who argue that the only constitutional claims that institutions can 
assert are free exercise claims of their members.  See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 62. 
225 For example, the claim available to the priest who has to sign the check for insurance under the 
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together with the question of whether application of a law threatens to 
undermine a religious institution’s capability of facilitating adherents’ 
development and realization of the good.  Institutions are different from 
individuals, and the protections that are appropriate for institutions may be 
greater, or lesser, than what is owed to individuals, depending upon the 
circumstance.      
These guidelines have important implications for the nascent 
ministerial exception doctrine.  The Supreme Court recently ruled in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC226 that employment 
discrimination claims cannot be asserted against churches in relation to 
employment decisions concerning the church’s ministers.  This is far more 
expansive (and narrower in some respects as well, as explained immediately 
below) than what the Religious Institution Principle endorses.   Under the 
principle, religious institutions do not have blanket immunity from 
governmental laws that bear on the hiring of its ministers. Rather, the 
Religious Institution Principle covers only those laws affecting the 
employment of ministers -- and potentially non-ministers as well -- that 
threaten to undermine the religious institution’s ability to enable their 
adherents to develop and live in accordance with the religion’s conception of 
the good.227 It is hard to see why the American with Disabilities Act – the 
federal law at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of disability -- would come under the principle’s coverage.228   
There are two possible arguments under the Religious Institution 
Principle in support of the ministerial exception.  First is a claim that the 
ADA is administered in a manner that endangers the religious institution’s 
ability to facilitate adherents’ development of, and ability to live in 
accordance with, the religion’s conception of the good.  This would be true 
if, for instance, hiring and termination decisions regularly led to costly and 
lengthy lawsuits that interfered with a religious institution’s ability to be led 
by its members’ preferred leader.229 But this would mean that a ministerial 
HHS mandate should not be confused with whatever claim the hospital may have as a religious 
institution. 
226 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).   
227 It is quite possible that non-ministers – indeed, that all employees in a religious institution – could 
satisfy this requirement.  Cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) 
(interpreting statutory exemption for religious organizations to employ “individuals of a particular 
religion” to include a janitor for church-owned gymnasium).  
228 To be sure, it is not inconceivable that a religion could have commitments  inconsistent with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  For example, the Pentateuch prohibits priests with enumerated 
physical infirmities from working in the Temple in Jerusalem.  See LEVITICUS 21:16-24.  But this 
limitation has never been understood as carrying over to rabbis, or to have operation outside of the 
Temple, and accordingly has no practical application to Jewish religious practice in the United States.   
229 For such an argument, see Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N. CAROL. 
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exception might be required as a pragmatic matter, though not as a matter of 
first principles.  Accordingly, pragmatic steps that remedied administrability 
concerns for religious institutions would then permit the law to be applied.    
Second, it might be claimed that the ministerial exception is an 
appropriate simplifying prophylactic rule for purposes of courts.  This would 
require elaboration of a sort that has not yet been provided, and about which 
I am initially skeptical. 
2. Laws Falling Within the Principle’s Coverage 
  a. Some examples 
What types of laws would fall within the Religious Institution 
Principle’s coverage?  Consider first a New York law that required every 
Russian Orthodox church in the state to treat as authoritative the 
determinations of the governing body of North American churches, rather 
than the Patriarch locum tenens of Moscow.230 That law threatened the 
ongoing integrity of the Russian Orthodox church, from that religion’s 
internal perspective.231  The Supreme Court overturned this law in the 1950s,  
a disposition that is consistent with the Religious Institution Principle.232        
A surprising number of laws similarly have interfered with particular 
churches’ internal governance.  For example, many nineteenth century 
property laws applicable to churches “reflected a Protestant democratic 
perspective on ecclesiastical structure under which congregants are the 
foundation of a church, own church property, and contract with clergy.”233  
These statutes “restricted the amount of land a religious organizations could 
possess,” “limited the annual value and income of real or personal property 
held by religious organizations,” and “regulated the structure of religious 
organizations, often in ways that empowered the laity.”234  Scholars have 
concluded that such laws were “fundamentally inconsistent with Catholic 
doctrine holding that ownership lies in the Church itself which determines 
L. REV. 1, 23 (2011). 
230 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 
96-102 (1952) (striking down this law).  This case is frequently discussed by scholars under the rubric 
of “church autonomy.” See generally Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEORGETOWN J. 
OF LAW & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2009).  
231 See id. at 258 (“Differences in church governance reflect deep theological disagreements”); see also 
supra note 201. 
232 See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.  The statement above in text assumes that there are no sufficiently 
important countervailing reasons that could justify infringement of the Religious Institution Principle. 
233 See Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions (draft on file with author, at 
37); Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism:  Liberal Theology, Anti-Catholicism, and Church Property, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 693, 709-10 (2002). 
234 Brownstein, supra note 233, at 34-36. 
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the rights of its parishioners.”235 These laws would come under the Religious 
Institution Principle’s coverage if, as likely is true, undercutting concentration 
of power and authority in priests were viewed by the Catholic Church as 
imperiling the institution’s capability of facilitating its adherents’ ability to 
develop and live in accordance with the Catholic Church’s conception of the 
good.   
A more recent example can be seen in Professor Barak Richman’s 
campaign to apply antitrust laws to the clergy hiring practices of the 
movement for Conservative Judaism.236  The Conservative movement 
requires member congregations to hire from a list of rabbis drawn up by the 
movement.  Richman argues that this constitutes an unlawful cartel, and that 
congregations should be able to hire whomever they wish.  The Conservative 
movement claims that such control is necessary for the Conservative 
movement to “set standards for worship, ritual and religious law, and to 
ensure that only rabbis committed to those standards lead congregations.”237  
“If each congregation is deciding for itself, some of these decisions will dilute 
the ability of this worldwide group of people to promote its vision 
worldwide.”238 Assuming that the Conservative movement constitutes a 
religious institution, the Religious Institution Principle’s coverage would 
extend to the antitrust laws.239  
  b. How Individualism Under-Protects 
Property laws restricting church’s property ownership and antitrust 
laws interfering with clergy appointment give rise to one type of harm that  
Individualism overlooks.  Recall that Schragger and Schwartzman argue that 
“general principles of freedom of association, privacy, and conscience are 
sufficient to protect all conscience-based associations, including churches,”240 
and that free exercise claims can be asserted only if individual members of 
the church “have been burdened in their free exercise of religion.”241  It is 
not at all clear that these individual-based concepts and doctrines would 
condemn the abovementioned applications of property restrictions and 
235 Id. at 37. 
236 See Samuel G. Freedman, Seeing and Battling a ‘Cartel’ in the Hiring of Rabbis, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(August 24, 2012). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. (quoting Rabbi Julie Schonfeld, Executive Vice President of the Conservative movement’s 
Rabbinical Assembly). 
239 As explained above, the Religious Institution Principle’s contents are determined on the basis of the 
internal perspective of the religion’s leaders.  See supra Part III.B.2.  For this reason, what matters is the 
Conservative Movement’s views of what their movement requires, not the views of a lay member like 
Professor Richman.  
240 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 5. 
241 Id. at 63. 
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antitrust law.242 But the Religious Institution Principle does: such laws 
interfere with a religious institution’s capability, from its internal perspective, 
of facilitating its adherents’ development and living in accordance with the 
religion’s conception of the good.  People in the original position would want 
to guard against such harms to religious institutions, even if such laws do not 
harm identifiable individuals through the causation mechanisms utilized to 
adjudicate individuals’ claims.    
Two hypotheticals shed additional light on how Individualism under-
protects religious institutions. Imagine first a federal law that requires large 
employers to make federally funded and provided contraceptive devices 
available in their bathrooms, to be stocked by federal workers for employers 
with ideological objections.  Would it be proper for the first law to be applied 
to Catholic hospitals?  To Churches?  Second, consider a law aimed at 
combatting unsupervised binge drinking that compels all colleges to allow 
alcoholic bars on their campuses, to be funded and operated by the 
government for any colleges with ideological objections. Can this law be 
applied to a Mormon or Islamic university, though each religion prohibits the 
consumption of alcohol by its co-religionists?   
As with the property ownership and antitrust laws, it is not clear why 
any of these applications would be problematic under Individualism.  After 
all, Schragger and Schwartzman parry objections to the contraception 
mandate on the ground that “[u]nless churches have their own consciences 
(and we have already argued that they do not), the institutional context does 
not add anything to the plaintiffs’ claim,” and they conclude that the only 
sort of claim that properly can be asserted is that “the individuals comprising 
those groups have been burdened in their free exercise of religion.”243  Since 
the abovementioned hypothetical laws do not compel any religious person to 
do anything, no individual would appear to have a free exercise claim to 
press.244  This conclusion is symptomatic of the Individualism’ shortcomings.  
The two proposed laws impose a real harm that ought to matter to political 
theory and law, but that is not captured by Individualism’s reduction of 
religious institutions to its members.   
More generally, there are two types of harms overlooked by 
Individualism, but protected by the Religious Institution Principle.  The first 
242 Perhaps the priest in whom the property otherwise would have vested could assert an individual-
based free exercise or statutory claim. In any event, an individual-focused claim misconceives the crux 
of the law’s harms, which are to the institution rather than the individual priest. 
243 Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 63. 
244 See also Corbin, supra note 7, at 158 (arguing that the contraception mandate is legally 
unproblematic because “genuine and independent decisions of private individuals . . . br[eak] the chain 
of attribution linking the religious conduct and the state”). 
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might be called “sacred space” harms.  Many religions believe that they 
require sacred spaces, which are created by physical attributes (such as size, 
beauty, and materials) as well as the persons and behaviors that are present -- 
and absent -- from the space.  Sacred spaces may be important even if no 
individual has a duty to visit, and if the space is forbidden to some co-
religionists.  Restricting a church’s property ownership threatens harm to a 
religion’s sacred space if a priest-apexed hierarchy is, from the religion’s 
internal perspective, a necessary element of its sacred space.  Likewise, a law 
requiring government-stocked contraceptive devices to be available in church 
restrooms likely would violate a religion’s understanding of sacred space.  For 
these reasons, there can be meaningful harm even if a law does not impose 
harms on identifiable individuals that are ascertainable by the causation 
analysis used to evaluate individuals’ claims.   
Second, Individualism overlooks what might be called “witnessing” 
harms.  Imagine a law that threatened the continued existence of religious 
hospitals or charitable organizations, but that did not interfere with the ability 
of religious individuals to work for non-religious hospitals and charities.  It is 
not clear why such a law would be problematic under Individualism insofar 
as individual doctors would be able to continue their social service work.  
The Religious Institution Principle, by contrast, has the conceptual resources 
for explaining why such a law may be problematic.  A religion’s conception 
of the good may include obligations that fall on the entire religious 
community rather than only individuals.  One such obligation may be bearing 
witness of the fact of God to non-coreligionists, and the religious hospitals 
and charitable organizations may be deemed indispensable to accomplishing 
this; good works undertaken by large groups of religious individuals united 
by religion may communicate God’s presence in a way that an individual’s 
good works cannot.  People in an original position would want to protect  
their religious community’s capability of realizing this aspect of their 
conception of the good, just as they would want to protect the individual’s 
ability to formulate and live in accordance with their religion’s conception of 
the good.  
IV. LIMITS TO THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION PRINCIPLE 
 Even as to laws fall within the Religious Institution Principle’s 
coverage, the principle does not provide absolute protections for two 
reasons.  First, the members of some religious traditions may not be 
permitted to ‘sit at the table’ and participate in the original position, and 
therefore the chosen basic political structure may not accommodate them or 
their religious institutions.  I discuss the criteria for drawing the line between 
participating and excluded religious traditions in Part IV.A.   Second, as 
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regards participating religious traditions, Rawls’ first principle of justice gives 
religious institutions generous, but non-absolute, protections.  I explore these 
substantive limitations on religious institutions in Part IV.B.   
A. Threshold Eligibility Requirements 
 Rawls carefully defines who it is that is imagined to be a participant in 
the original position:  only people who satisfy the “the political conception of 
the person.”245 Defining the political conception of the person is therefore 
critical, for it is only people who satisfy the conditions of the political 
conception of the person whose interests must be taken into account when 
setting up the basic structure of the just state. Persons who fall outside the 
political conception of the person are not guaranteed that their interests will 
be protected because people in the original position need not consider that 
they may represent such persons.246  Accordingly, the political structure 
chosen under the original position will not extend protections to all religions 
nor, by extension, to all religions’ religious institutions.  
We now are in a position to see a crucial distinction between Separate 
Spherists and the Religious Institution Principle.  The logic of Separate 
Sphere suggests that its conclusions apply to all churches. From the 
perspective of the Religious Institution Principle, by contrast, religious 
institutions do not have inherent autonomy simply by virtue of the fact that 
they are religious institutions.  Further, what makes a religion eligible is not a 
function of age; the fact that a church may have “preexisted the state”247 does 
not trigger the Religious Institution Principle.  Instead, eligibility is 
determined by the characteristics of the religious community. 
What are those characteristics?  According to Rawls, the political 
conception of the person “begins from our everyday conception of persons 
as the basic units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility.”248 Under it, 
people are “seen as capable of revising and changing [their conception of the 
good] on reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they so 
desire.”249  Rawls clearly thinks that most religions’ understanding of 
personhood satisfy the political conception of the person, and hence that 
participants in the original position would have to consider that they might 
245 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 29. 
246 Id. at 103. 
247 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 55.  
248 Id. at 20.  Elsewhere I have argued that this is narrower than necessary, and that maximally 
broadening participants in the original position better realizes Rawls’ foundational objectives.  See 
Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26, at 12-20. 
249 Id. at 30; see also id. at 31-32 and 302. 
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represent a religious person.250  Some religions (and non-religious 
comprehensive views), however, do not satisfy the political conception of the 
person, and hence would not be represented at the original position.  Below I 
will explore in detail the characteristics of excluded religions, and explain why 
such exclusion is justifiable.251  For now, it is sufficient to note that the 
Religious Institution Principle does not protect all religions simply by virtue 
of the fact that they are religions.       
B. Permissible Substantive Limits on Religious Institutions 
Rawls concludes that participants in the original position will select 
two principles of justice.  As explained above, the Religious Institution 
Principle is derived from the first principle of justice.  But the first principle 
of justice imposes many other requirements, some of which apply to the 
Religious Institutional Principle itself.  
To review, the first principle of justice is that “[e]ach person has an 
equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” “Fully adequate 
scheme” refers to the “criterion . . . to specify and adjust the basic liberties so 
as to allow the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of 
both moral powers in the social circumstances under which the two 
fundamental cases arise in the well-ordered society in question.”252  Relevant 
for present purposes is the “second fundamental case,” which “is connected 
with the capacity for a (complete) conception of the good (normally 
associated with a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine), 
and concerns the exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in forming, 
revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life.”253 
The first principle accordingly provides three limitations that operate 
on the Religious Institution Principle itself:  the first principle of justice (1) 
presumes a “well-ordered society,” (2) demands that the scheme of liberty be 
“compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all,” and (3) understands 
that the basic liberties will be “specif[ied] and adjust[ed]” to allow for the full 
and informed exercise of all citizens’ two moral powers.  
250 Evidence of this pervades Rawls’ work.  One of Rawls’ aims is to explain why people holding 
various “comprehensive views,” which for him includes religious persons, would agree to structure 
government on the basis of “political” (rather than their comprehensive) views that all citizens can 
reasonably be expected to endorse.  See generally id. at 3-130; 212-54. 
251 See infra Part V.C. 
252 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at 333. 
253 Id. 
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1. The “Well-Orderedness” Requirement 
 The first principle of justice presumes a “well-ordered society,” 
meaning a polity in which “citizens have a normally effective sense of justice” 
such that “they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they 
regard as just.”254 Well-orderedness requires conditions that permit and 
promote an “enduring and secure” political regime,255 thereby avoiding 
sectarian conflicts of the sort found in the centuries-long European wars of 
religion.256  
The well-orderedness requirement has many implications.  First, 
liberalism can only accommodate religions committed to peace with non-
coreligionists in the sense that the religion does not aspire to use government 
to coerce conversion or religious practice.257 This requirement, like the 
political conception of the person, means that liberalism cannot  
accommodate all religions.  The absence of such a limit would threaten to 
reintroduce the sectarian conflicts that liberalism has largely eliminated.258   
More than this, well-orderedness imposes important limitations on 
those religious institutions (and individuals) that can be accommodated by a 
liberal state.  The Religious Institution Principle does not protect practices 
that threaten general society’s well-orderedness.  The well-orderedness 
requirement thus justifies the Court’s approach, though not necessarily its 
outcome, in Reynolds v. United States.259 The Court in Reynolds upheld a 
polygamy ban on the ground that polygamy threatened to undermine general 
society’s moral fabric.260  Of course, whether the Court was correct that 
polygamy presented such a danger is an empirical question that the well-
orderedness requirement cannot answer.261  Further, even if the Court was 
correct when the case was decided, the answer to what well-orderedness 
demands necessarily turns on time-specific cultural sensibilities and practices.  
Reynold’s holding accordingly cannot be assumed to be eternally valid.     
254 Id. at 35. 
255 Id. at 38. 
256 See id. at xxviii. 
257 Kent Greenawalt has suggested to me in conversation that this might be overly restrictive, and that 
the size of the religious group and the threat it likely poses ought to be taken into account when 
applying front-end restrictions.  I respectfully disagree.  Religions can grow quickly, and it is reasonable 
to assume that people in the original position would not want to create a political structure that so 
directly sowed the seeds of its own instability. 
258 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at xxiii-xxvi. 
259 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
260 Id. at 168.  
261 This does not undermine well-orderedness’s utility, but only illustrates that difficult application 
questions invariably will arise. 
                                                   
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                51 
 
What other practices would run afoul of well-orderedness?  This can 
only be answered at Rawls’ second stage, and any answer must be determined 
on the basis of interlocking empirical and normative considerations.  To 
explain, it is an empirical question as to what (if any) practices in a religious 
institution threaten the stability of larger society, and it is to be expected that 
the answer will vary across societies and time.   But what empirically is 
destabilizing undoubtedly depends in part on a society’s views as to whether 
accommodating minority comprehensive views is normatively desirable.  As 
explained above, people in the original position would be wary of selecting a 
political structure that precluded them from developing and living in 
accordance with the conception of the good that was held by the person they 
represented.  So the normative view that shapes the empirics must be as 
welcoming to minority views as is possible.   
To be more concrete, the following non-exhaustive list of practices – 
all of which have been endorsed by some religions at some time – certainly 
would run afoul of well-orderedness in today’s United States:  child sacrifice, 
adult sacrifice, sexual rituals involving children, corporal punishment, and 
slaveholding.  Discrimination on the basis of race may be a slightly harder 
question, but I think it also would.262  Discrimination on the basis of gender, 
sexual orientation, or religion, it seems to me, would not.   
Importantly, well-orderedness also imposes affirmative obligations on 
religious institutions.  For example, well-orderedness creates educational 
obligations that necessarily will fall on religious schools that qualify as 
religious institutions.  Students taught in religious schools must be educated 
in a manner that encourages them to understand the justice of the polity in 
which they live so that they willingly comply with the basic institutions of 
society. It also is essential to equip them with the attitudes and habits 
required to achieve and secure a stable democratic polity.263 In the end, what 
education is required by well-orderedness is an empirical determination that 
inevitably turns on human psychology and context-specific factors.  
2.     The Compatibility Requirement 
The first principle of justice calls for a basic structure that is 
“compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”  This is another important 
internal limitation to the Religious Institution Principle.  To satisfy the 
compatibility requirement, persons must have the right to opt-out of the 
environment in which they find themselves.    
262 Cf. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
263 I owe this formulation to a suggestion from Michael Walzer. 
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 To understand why, imagine a church that sought to flatly prohibit its 
members from exiting. Persons living in a such a religious community who 
did not share its adherents’ commitments and who felt that remaining in the 
community impeded their ability to develop and realize their conception of 
the good would not enjoy the same liberty  enjoyed by a person who lived 
outside the church and was satisfied by it.  To make the liberty of members 
of religious communities “compatible with a similar scheme of liberties” for 
those who do not identify with religious communities, people in religious 
communities must have the ability to opt-out and leave the community into 
which they happened to be born. 
 The exit requirement means that religious institutions are severely 
constrained in the respects in which they deal with people they deem to be 
heretics.  While some manner of informal communal censuring of heterodox 
behavior is to be expected and would not be problematic, actions that 
hindered adherents from leaving the community – like seizing their property, 
or utilizing a communal property regime that did not afford fair 
compensation for exiting members –could not be tolerated.   
 Many other practices could function as constraints on exit and hence 
run afoul of the compatibility requirement.  This has significant educational 
ramifications:  adherents must know something about life outside of their 
religious community, and must have sufficient education to be able to survive 
outside their community.264  For another example, consider a religion that 
deemed its family laws, which did not permit divorce, to be necessary for its 
adherents’ development and living in accordance with the religion’s 
conception of the good.  Even if its family law otherwise qualified as a 
religious institution, the compatibility requirement would not allow the 
religious community to be immune from the state’s family law and to live in 
accordance with its own. The same would be true of a religion whose family 
laws permitted child marriage.  Even if divorce were permitted, the cost of 
divorce for persons who had entered into marriage at a young age probably 
would be too great a constraint on free exit.  (Of course child marriage might  
be barred on the independent ground of well-orderedness). 
As a final example, practices that unduly interfered with an adherent’s 
ability to live a full and meaningful life outside the religious community 
would violate compatibility’s exit requirement.  Extreme forms of 
circumcision that disabled a person from reproducing, or that unduly limited 
the chances that she would be able to find a mate outside the community, 
would run afoul of this.   
264 For a fuller discussion, see Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26. 
                                                   
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                53 
 
3.     Accommodating Competing Liberties 
a.     Rawls’ Approach 
The first principle of justice states that the basic liberties must be 
“specif[ied] and adjust[ed]” to allow for the full and informed exercise of all 
citizens’ two moral powers.265  As a result, “[n]o basic liberty is absolute . . 
.”266  Instead, basic “liberties may conflict in particular cases and their claims 
must be adjusted to fit into one coherent scheme of liberties.”267 Such 
adjustments mean that one “basic liberty can be limited or denied [only] for 
the sake of one or more other basic liberties.”268 
This set of understandings importantly sets the Religious Institution 
Principle apart from both Separate Spherists and Individualism. As to the 
former, whereas the Separate Spherists spoke of church autonomy and 
jurisdictional independence, Rawls understands that there can be competing 
fundamental commitments that accordingly require adjustments and 
limitations of all.  Although the Religious Institution Principle is derived 
from the basic liberties (insofar as religious institutions are necessary to allow 
the full and informed development and exercise of a complete conception of 
the good), the Religious Institution Principle cannot be absolute, pace the 
Separate Spherists.   
Second, whereas Lockean-premised Individualism provides neither a 
principled justification for churches’ non-absolute protections nor guidance 
for how churches’ interests should be reconciled with competing 
commitments, the Religious Institution Principle does both.  Churches’ 
protections cannot be absolute because there are multiple foundational 
commitments that people would select behind a veil of ignorance:  they 
desire to create a well-ordered society in which everyone – regardless of what 
comprehensive view they happen to have – has an opportunity to develop 
and live in accordance with their complete conception of the good.  Further, 
original position participants’ choice of multiple basic liberties provides 
substantial guidance in determining how liberties should be specified and 
adjusted. 
Rawls’ approach for specifying and adjusting (when they conflict) the 
basic liberties can be usefully illustrated by considering the contraception 
mandate controversy.  Let us assume for present purposes that Catholic 
265 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 333. 
266 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 104. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 111. 
                                                   
 
 
Rosen                Religious Institutions and the State:  A Liberal Theory                54 
 
hospitals qualify as a religious institution, and also that the contraception 
mandate falls within the Religious Institutional Principle’s coverage.269  These 
assumptions do not automatically lead to the conclusion that the 
contraception mandate was wrong, because there are two countervailing 
considerations.     
First, Rawls notes that the first principle of justice “may be preceded 
by a lexically prior principle requiring that basic needs be met, at least insofar 
as their being met is a necessary condition for citizens to understand and to 
be able fruitfully to exercise the basic rights and liberties.”270  What qualifies 
as basic needs invariably must be determined at the second stage, and 
supporters of the contraception mandate claim that women’s ability to 
determine if and when they are to be pregnant is a basic need for women in 
the United States.  As was true of determining the scope of the Religious 
Institution Principle, what matters is not the truth of this claim, but the 
anticipated perception of people behind the veil of ignorance at either the 
first or second stage.271   
Second, the contraception mandate may implicate another basic 
liberty at the stage of the first principle of justice itself.  Rawls refers to the 
“liberty and integrity (physical and psychological) of the person” as a basic 
liberty.272 Women’s access to contraception may implicate this physical and 
psychological liberty. Rawls explains that physical and psychological integrity 
are a basic liberty insofar as they “are necessary if the other basic liberties are 
to be properly guaranteed.”273  Contraception may be a prerequisite to these 
physical and psychological liberties, which presume a “capacity for a 
(complete) conception of the good (normally associated with a 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine), and concerns the 
exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in forming, revising, and 
rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life.”274 People in the 
original position or second stage would recognize that reasonable people 
could think that a woman’s ability to control her reproductive life is 
necessary if she is to live in accordance with her conception of the good, and 
269 As discussed above, neither of these assumptions is self-evidently correct.   
270 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 44 & n. 7. 
271 See supra text and accompanying note 213. 
272 Id. at 113.  Consider as well Rawls’ justification for the proposition that “[a]mong the basic rights is 
the right to hold and to have the exclusive use of personal property.”  He states that “[o]ne ground of 
this right is to allow a sufficient material basis for personal independence and a sense of self-respect, both of which 
are essential for the adequate development and exercise of the moral powers.” Id. at 114 (emphasis supplied).  This 
too might be grounds to conclude that access to contraception is a basic liberty. 
273 Id. at 113. 
274 Id. 
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hence would understand that the basic liberties include access to 
contraception. 
It might be responded that women do not need contraception to 
control their reproductive lives because they instead can be abstinent.  But 
this violates what Rawls calls the “strains of commitment,” which requires 
that “those they represent [in the original position] can reasonably be 
expected to honor the principle agreed to in the manner required by the idea 
of an agreement.” 275 Insofar as “[t]he original position is framed to rule out 
all excuses,”276 participants must choose arrangements (including 
specifications of liberty) which people plausibly can be expected to both 
agree to and abide by.  Accordingly, the suggestion that people behind a veil 
would choose an arrangement that required sexual abstinence must be 
rejected because it violates the strains of commitment. 
If women’s access to contraception is a basic liberty, and if the 
contraception mandate implicate the Religious Institution Principle, then the 
mandate controversy involves a  conflict among basic liberties.  Rawls 
provides substantial guidance as to how such conflicts should be managed.  
“[A] liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is more or less 
essentially involve in, or is a more or less necessary institutional means to 
protect, the full and informed exercise of the moral powers,” which 
presumes a person’s “capacity for a (complete) conception of the good 
(normally associated with a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrine), and concerns the exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in 
forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete 
life.”277  “The more significant liberties mark out the central range of 
application of a particular basic liberty; and in cases of conflict we look for a 
way to accommodate the more significant liberties within the central range of 
each.”278   
Two additional points bear mention.  First, determining the degree to 
which the contraception mandate implicates these two liberties is non-
obvious and controversial.  As to the Religious Institution Principle, to what 
degree does a requirement that Catholic hospitals fund health insurance 
covering their employees’ contraceptive devices threaten Catholics’ ability to 
develop and live in accordance with their religion’s conceptions of the good?  
As to women employees’ liberty interests, to what degree is bodily and 
psychological liberty undermined if a woman’s employer did not pay for 
275 Id. at 103. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
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contraception, given the fact that until enactment of the Affordable Care Act 
nobody was guaranteed that their employer would pay for contraception?  
These and other considerations, which involve analysis at Rawls’ third and 
fourth stages, are relevant to determining the degree to which the 
contraception mandate controversy implicates countervailing basic liberties, 
which is the first step to resolving conflicts among basic liberties.  Further 
analysis of these important issues necessarily lies beyond this Article’s scope. 
Second, when conflicts among basic liberties are present, the 
preferred approach is to eliminate the conflicts, if possible.  To the extent the 
Obama Administration’s recently proposed revisions of the HHS regulations 
succeed in dissolving the conflict – they all are mechanisms under which 
institutions apart from the religious hospitals fund contraception for 
employees279  – the proposals are not just ‘smart politics,’ but are necessary as 
a matter of the first principle of justice.   
b. Contemporary Constitutional Practice 
 Up to this point, this Article’s account of the Religious Institution 
Principle has remained fully consistent with Rawls’ political theory.  It is 
important, however, to identify one significant respect in which Rawls 
diverges sharply from contemporary United States constitutional practices, 
and indeed the practices of virtually all other constitutional democracies.  As 
indicated above, Rawls identifies a category of “basic liberties” that are 
lexically prior to other liberties in the sense that tradeoffs are permissible 
only among basic liberties, but not between a basic and non-basic liberty.280  
Contemporary constitutional practice, by contrast, does not have a hierarchy 
of constitutional liberties.  Even more importantly, the ordinary practice is to 
allow constitutional commitments to be traded off against competing sub-
constitutional commitments of sufficient importance in certain circumstances.  
For instance, in the United States, constitutional principles of free speech 
and equal protection  allow for regulations that are narrowly designed to 
realize interests that are “compelling” but not of constitutional dimension.281 
279 See Robert Pear, Compromise Idea for the Insuring of Birth Control, THE NEW YORK TIMES A1 (February 
2, 2013). 
280 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 111 (noting that “none of the basic liberties . . . is 
absolute, as they may be limited when they conflict with one another.”); id. at 105 (rejecting the 
approach that a basic liberty is “commensurable” with other “human interests” such that “for any two 
interests, given the extent to which they are satisfied, there is always some rate of exchange at which a 
rational person is willing to accept a lesser fulfillment of the one in return for a greater fulfillment of 
the other, and vice versa”). 
281See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“Whenever the government treats any 
person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within 
the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.  But that observation says 
nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court 
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In most other countries, constitutionally protected interests may be regulated 
if there are sufficiently important sub-constitutional interests that satisfy 
“proportionality” analysis.282   
 I cannot hope in this Article to consider whether Rawls’ more 
restrictive approach to accommodating competing liberties is correct and, if 
it is not, how it should be refitted.283 If Rawls’ approach merits refashioning, 
however, then the Religious Institution Principle’s protections are even less 
absolute, and the legitimate occasions for accommodating countervailing 
interests are even more extensive, than the analysis in the preceding 
subsection suggests.     
C. Summary of the Religious Institution Principle 
 The Religious Institution Principle gives rise to a four-step inquiry in 
analyzing the normative strength of religious institutional claims:  (1) Is the 
proposed beneficiary a protected religion?,  If so, (2) is it a religious 
institution?  If so, (3) does the governmental regulation fall within the 
coverage of the Religious Institution Principle?  And finally, if so, (4) are 
there sufficiently important countervailing considerations that nonetheless 
can justify a compromise of the religious institution’s interests?   
V. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS 
This final Part considers, and replies to, some difficult questions that 
may be leveled at the Religious Institution Principle. 
A. What counts as a “Religion”? 
 It might be objected that the Religious Institution Principle is 
problematic insofar as it requires government to define religion.  The answer 
is that such a demand already is made by the Constitution’s free exercise and 
establishment clauses and the many statutes284 that reference religion, and 
applying strict scrutiny.”); Roe v. Wade, (holding that although fetuses are not a constitutional life 
interest, the state has a sufficiently important interest in protecting the fetus that it may prohibit a 
women from exercising her constitution right to abort under certain conditions); see generally 
Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429 (1993).    
282See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS (2012); Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 GEO. L.J. 1289, 1291 
(2011) (“[M]any of the world's most respected constitutional courts, including the courts of Canada, 
Germany, Israel, India, and South Africa, in addition to the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice, incorporate balancing into forms of proportionality analysis.”) 
283 With one exception:  below I suggest one reason for questioning Rawls’ approach.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 290-292. 
284 Including but not limited to, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious LUIPA, state-
RFRAs, employment laws, and tax code exemptions for houses of worship. 
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that American law has successfully determined what counts as religion when 
pressed to do so.285  Furthermore, definitional problems of religion may be 
less acute under this Article’s proposal than the aforementioned 
constitutional and statutory provisions insofar as non-religious commitments 
also are entitled to protection (through the Non-Religious Institution 
Principle286), thereby reducing the significance of religion’s definition. 
 A related objection asks how the Religious Institution Principle 
would apply to a series of hypothetical religions, such as the “Church of 
Gold” (which thought all its adherents had to be multi-millionaires or that its 
churches had to be paved in gold) or the “Church of the Smokestack” 
(whose mission embraced allowing its members to spew air pollution in their 
professional lives).287  To begin, many hypotheticals of this sort likely would 
not be accorded the status of legitimate religions for purposes of the law.  
But what if there were a legitimate religion whose mission either required 
massive subsidies from government (as with the Church of Gold) or 
demanded that government ignore the religion’s spillover effects (as with the 
Church of the Smokestack)?   
The answer is that the first principle of justice does not provide 
absolute protections, and would not categorically require accommodation of 
these religious institutions’ demands.  As to the Church of Gold, the 
Religious Institution Principle would not require government to give millions 
of dollars to members of the Church of Gold because each person is only 
entitled to “an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties 
which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”288  Simply stated, the 
liberty of being a multimillionaire is not compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for all other citizens.289   
As to the Church of the Smokestack, it seems that if it indeed were a 
legitimate religion, then Rawls would conclude it must be accommodated 
insofar as Rawls grants the liberty to live in accordance with one’s conception 
of the good strict lexical priority to non-basic liberties.290  
285 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY7 (“The question of 
what ‘religion’ means is theoretically intractable but, as a practical matter, barely relevant.  We know it 
when we see it.”).  
286 See supra text and note 306. 
287 I am thankful to Professor Tushnet and Professor Vermeule for these hypotheticals. 
288 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 291 (emphasis supplied). 
289 A contrary conclusion would lead to the predictable (and impossible to accommodate) result of a 
massive influx of converts to the Church of Gold.  If that church sought to limit membership, then 
offshoot independent churches undoubtedly would immediately sprout, leading to the same untenable 
situation. 
290 It seems unlikely that the protections afforded by the environmental regulations from which the 
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This conclusion may constitute cause for reworking Rawls lexical 
approach to basic liberties.  As Rawls writes, “we can, of course, check the 
priority of liberty [that Rawls endorses] by looking for counterexamples, and 
consider whether, on due reflection, the resulting priority judgment can be 
endorsed . . . . [I]f careful search uncovers no counter-cases, the priority of 
liberty would be so far perfectly reasonable.” 291  Accordingly, if the Church 
of the Smokestack constitutes a “counter-case” that strikes us upon 
reflection as a mistaken priority judgment, then retaining the priority of 
liberty is no longer “perfectly reasonable.” A plausible alternative is the 
approach taken by today’s constitutional democracies of permitting 
regulations of constitutional commitments when there are sufficiently 
important countervailing considerations.292  Under it, the Church of the 
Smokestack’s claim could be rejected on the ground that environmental laws 
advance the sufficiently important governmental interest of protecting the 
environment and guarding human health.  
B. Religious Persons and the Original Position 
Why would a person in the original position, recognizing she might 
represent an orthodox Catholic who believed that the Church has an 
ontological institutional reality that precedes and is independent of the 
state,293 agree to the Religious Institution Principle, which permits some 
secular interference with the Church?  Instead, why wouldn’t a person in the 
original position, recognizing she might represent an orthodox Catholic, 
select a political structure that accorded churches the independence taught by 
her religious tradition (or, following the differentiation principle, granted 
independent status to those churches that, from their internal point of view, 
have this ontological status)? 
The answer is this: the person in the original position would not 
select rules that allowed self-selecting churches to be independent of the state 
because she recognizes that she might represent someone who were not an 
orthodox Catholic. Granting carte blanche to any institution is never a free 
lunch; it always comes at the expense of some individuals or other 
institutions.  For instance, a religious institution might reject the idea that 
persons it deems to be members can exit from the church, and the person in 
the original position might represent someone born into the church who 
Church of the Smokestack seeks exemptions implicate a basic liberty.  If it did – if the absence of 
environmental protections could plausibly be said to violate citizens’ liberty of bodily integrity – then 
its claims could be compromised even under Rawls’ framework.  
291 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 105-6. 
292 See supra text and accompanying notes 26-27 and notes 282-285. 
293 See supra text and accompanying note 30. 
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wanted to leave.  It is not sufficient to respond “but the Catholic Church 
would not do this,” because granting independence to the Catholic Church 
would entail granting independence to other churches as well.294  Recognizing 
this, a person in the original position would not select a political structure 
that allowed churches to be wholly independent of secular oversight.  
Against this response, it might be asked why an orthodox Catholic 
would agree to participate in the original position in the first place.  Before 
proceeding with an answer, it is important to observe that this is a challenge 
that goes to the heart of Rawlsian political theory.  I cannot provide a full 
response here – Rawls spends literally hundreds of pages providing what in 
effect is an answer295 – though I momentarily will provide an executive 
summary.  But any response I give cannot hope to be complete insofar as 
rejecting Rawls’ answer amounts to a wholesale rejection of Rawlsian political 
theory, and fully defending Rawls’ political theory naturally lies beyond this 
Article’s scope. 
The core of the Rawlsian project is to equate justice with fairness,296 
and to posit that fair political institutions are those that would be chosen by  
people if they were not self-interested.  The problem is that everyone is self-
interested. The original position, as explained above, is a heuristic designed to 
allow people to imagine what a non-self-interested perspective would be.297  
This is not to suggest that there is no place for hardball politics of self-
interest under Rawls’ approach.  There certainly is.  But it comes after fair 
democratic ‘rules of the road’ have been selected at the original position and 
second stage;  fair institutions and starting rules ensure that the results of 
hardball politics themselves are fair.  And Rawls’ heuristic is intended to aid 
with the prior steps of establishing fair baseline institutions and procedures.  
So the answer to as to why an orthodox Catholic would agree to 
participate in the original position is this:  it’s only fair to do so.  It’s only fair 
to choose those political institutions and arrangements that would be chosen 
by people behind a veil of ignorance, who accordingly did not who it was 
they represented.  
294 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 111 (noting that “however these liberties are 
adjusted, that final scheme is to be secured equally for all citizens.”). 
295 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 3-172.  
296 As the title of Rawls’ final book-length summary of his life’s work suggests:  Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement.   
297 See supra Part III.A. 
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C. The Adequacy of the Religious Institution Principle 
Even if one were to accept the answers provided in the immediately 
preceding subsection (and thereby accept the original position and the first 
principle of justice), the following objection still might be propounded:  are 
the protections afforded by the Religious Institution Principle adequate, such 
that people in the original position would agree to them?  This would 
amount to a critique of this Article’s derivation of the Religious Institution 
Principle, rather than the previous subsection’s wholesale attack on Rawls.  
There are three respects in which the Religious Institution Principle 
may be thought to inadequately protect religious institutions.  First, the 
Religious Institution Principle does not apply to all religions. Second, the 
principle only covers matters that are “indispensable” for religious 
institutions’ capabilities of facilitating adherents’ abilities to develop, and live 
in accordance with, the religion’s conception of the good; it does not extend 
to matters that are “helpful” for religious institutions.  Third, even as to 
covered matters, the Religious Institution Principle’s protections are not 
absolute.   
As a result of these three considerations, some religions’ religious 
institutions may not be in a position to do what is necessary, from their 
internal perspective, to allow their adherents to develop and live in 
accordance with the religion’s conception of the good.  If so, why would 
people in the original position, understanding that they might represent a 
person who belonged to such a religion, agree to the Religious Institution 
Principle? 
The answer must start with an acknowledgment that no single polity 
can realistically accommodate all people.  For instance, the United States 
cannot tolerate the Taliban.  Rawls operationalizes permissible exclusions 
through the political conception of the person (PCP) insofar as only people 
who satisfy the   PCP participate in the original position.298  Those religious 
traditions that reject the PCP’s assumptions that individuals are the “basic 
units of thought and responsibility” are likely to embrace a commitment to 
using political power to compel religious practice.299  The point of the 
298 See supra Part IV.A. 
299 Elsewhere I have explained the connection between Rawls’ definition of the PCP and governmental 
compulsion of religious practices, and also suggested that Rawls’ definition of the PCP is unnecessarily 
(and therefore problematically) broad.  See Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26, at 12-20.  What 
matters for present purposes is not the precise scope of the PCP’s exclusion, but the fact that the 
polity created by Rawlsian theory (as well as my reworking of it) does not purport to accommodate 
every religious tradition.    
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original position’s thought experiment is to identify political institutions that 
would accommodate the broadest range of people -- but not everybody.  
To this the following might be asked:  why does the original position 
try to identify political institutions that would be acceptable to the broadest 
range of people?   Stated differently, why would people in the original 
position select a large, heterogeneous polity, rather than small, homogeneous 
polities?  This is a difficult question because there likely are costs to 
heterogeneous polities. For example, the need to accommodate diverse 
cultural groups limits the degree to which governmental institutions can 
support (or at least not undermine) each distinct cultural group.  For 
example, the size and diversity of the United States account for the fact that 
the Religious Institution Principle only applies to matters that are indispensable 
for American religious institutions.300   
While there clearly are benefits to large diverse polities that require 
no elaboration here, there is no reason to think that all people in an original 
position would agree that one type of polity – small and homogeneous, or 
large and diverse – would be preferred by every reasonable person. Rather, 
some individuals, on account of their personal preferences and 
comprehensive views, can be expected to prefer large, heterogenous polities, 
and others to prefer small, homogeneous polities.  This suggests that rather 
than running the original position’s thought experiment on a country-by-
country basis – as Rawls does --  it ought to be performed on an international 
basis.301  Doing so leads to the following conclusion:  people in the original 
position would choose to create a diverse set of countries in the world from 
which people could choose – both large heterogeneous and small 
homogeneous polities.302  It also might mean that large heterogeneous 
polities like the United States, from which exit is particularly costly, should 
allow for substantially empowered sub-federal (and probably sub-state) 
polities within which people who prefer small homogeneous polities can be 
substantially free to govern themselves.303   
300 This is true because not all commitments can be simultaneously realized.  See generally GUIDO 
CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES.  For instance, well-orderedness can come into 
conflict with the Religious Institution Principle, and the Religious Institution Principle can conflict with 
individual liberties, as discussed above.  See supra Part IV.B.3. 
301 To be clear, this constitutes a reworking of Rawls’ framework, not a mere application of it.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 26-27 (justifying this).  A full exposition of this idea, though beyond the 
scope of this Article, is the subject of a work-in-progress.  See Mark D. Rosen, Is a Non-Neutral Liberal 
State an Oxymoron? (copy on file with author). 
302 See id. 
303 For a full defense of this position, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 26. 
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We are now in a position to explain the adequacy of the Religious 
Institution Principle. People in the original position would want to create 
both large heterogeneous polities (like the United States) and small 
homogeneous polities.  This Article has focused on articulating the Religious 
Institution Principle and fleshing out its (stage 2 and 3) implications in large 
heterogeneous polities.  People in the original position would agree to the 
contents of the Religious Institution Principle described here, even though 
some religions’ religious institutions would not be accommodated, for three 
interlocking reasons:  (1) only applications of the Religious Institution 
Principle described here would be workable in a large, diverse polity; (2)  size 
and diversity offers benefits that may appeal to some religious people,  
notwithstanding the limitations that diversity necessarily imposes on 
realizations of the Religious Institution Principle; and (3) there also would be 
options of  small, homogeneous polities.  
D.     Does the Religious Institution Principle Create Problematic 
Asymmetries? 
It might be objected that the Religious Institution Principle is 
normatively undesirable because it creates two asymmetries.  First, the 
Religious Institution Principle may be thought to lead to an asymmetry 
between religions and non-religious commitments insofar as it provides 
special protections only for religious institutions (the “Religion/Non-
Religion Asymmetry Critique”).  Second, the Religious Institution Principle 
may be thought to lead to an asymmetry between religious institutions and 
the state insofar as the principle imposes significant limits on what the state 
can do to influence religious institutions, but does not constrain religious 
institutions’ efforts to influence laws (the “State/Religion Asymmetry 
Critique”).304   
 1. The Religion/Non-Religion Asymmetry Critique  
The “Religion/Non-Religion Asymmetry Critique” builds on an 
extensive contemporary literature claiming that it is normatively problematic 
to favor religion over non-religious commitments.305  But even assuming that 
religion is not meaningfully different from non-theological commitments for 
purposes of politics,306 the Religion/Non-Religion Asymmetry Critique is 
unfounded.  The Religious Institution Principle is implied by the first 
304 Cf. Micah Schartzman, What if Religion Isn’t Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). 
305 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER AND LAWRENCE W. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION.  
306 Many do not accept this assumption. For powerful arguments as to why religion appropriately is 
treated differently in the United States, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 285, at 120-65.  
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principle of justice on account of the role that religion plays in developing, 
and facilitating actualization of, peoples’ conceptions of the good.  But Rawls 
makes no claim that religion alone does this.  To the contrary, his explanation 
of the original position (which refers to the need to “take the religious, 
philosophical or moral convictions of persons seriously”307) proves otherwise.  For this 
reason, the Religious Institution Principle does not imply that religious 
institutions alone demand protection.  Simply stated, the existence of the 
Religious Institution Principle does not preclude what might be called a ‘non-
Religious Institution Principle.’  
One who claims the existence of a non-Religious Institution 
Principle, however, properly bears two burdens.  First, she must identify 
what non-religious systems would be viewed by people behind the veil (or at 
the second stage) as aiming to develop and facilitate the fully informed 
exercise of the capacity to formulate a conception of the good, and hence 
qualifying under the first principle of justice. Second, she must identify what 
non-religious institutions would be seen by people behind the veil (or second 
stage) as being necessary for the non-religious system to accomplish the 
above aim.   
In making the argument on behalf of the non-Religious Institution 
Principle, it is not sufficient to say that “bowling leagues are really important 
to some people,” or even that “bowling is what allows some people to fully 
self-actualize in their view.” While both may be true, the question instead is 
whether it plausibly can be maintained that people behind the veil of 
ignorance, reasoning in an original position or at the second stage, would 
identify bowling leagues as the sorts of institutions that would receive special 
protection under the first principle of justice.   
To be clear, this Article does not claim that the non-Religious 
Institution Principle comprises a null set.  That principle’s contents instead 
turn on empirical considerations that are society-dependent.  But, as 
explained earlier, it is unquestionably true that the Religious Institution 
Principle is not a null-set in contemporary America. If the non-Religious 
Institution Principle happens to protect no institutions in a particular society, 
this would not be a justifiable basis for condemning the fact that the 
Religious Institution Principle does.  Any such asymmetry merely would 
reflect the fact that religions are different from non-religious systems in a 
respect that matters for people reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance or 
at the second stage in a particular society. 
307 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 19 (emphasis supplied). 
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 2. The State/Religion Asymmetry Critique 
Micah Schwartzman recently has done yeoman’s work articulating a  
case for symmetry between the state and religion, inveighing against “claims 
that religious convictions are not special for justifying political and legal 
decisions, but that they are special for purposes of obtaining 
accommodations.”308 Schwartzman argues that such a position is internally 
inconsistent, if not self-servingly hypocritical.  He instead argues that that 
either (1) religions are special, and hence they appropriately receive special 
protections but also cannot aim to influence state laws, or that (2) religions are 
not special, and hence can aim to influence state laws but are not entitled to 
special protections either.  I shall dub this the State/Religion Asymmetry 
Critique.   
It might be thought that the Religious Institution Principle is 
problematic because it is susceptible to the State/Religion Asymmetry 
Critique.  But there are two reasons why the State/Religion Asymmetry 
Critique does not undermine the Religious Institution Principle.  
   a. Public Reason 
 First, the State/Religion Asymmetry Critique may not apply to the 
Religious Institution Principle, as a matter of internal Rawlsian political 
theory, because Rawls does impose constraints on how religions behave 
toward the state through what he calls the “public reason” requirement.  
Public reason refers to the constraints that are placed upon the types of 
reasons that can be drawn upon, by those to whom public reason applies, in 
setting a polity’s decisions concerning “fundamental political questions,” 
which comprise “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.” 309  
One requirement that is “expressed in” public reason is what Rawls calls the 
“criterion of reciprocity.”310  The “criterion of reciprocity” is more expansive 
in application than public reason insofar as the former applies not only to 
fundamental political questions but also to “particular statutes and laws 
enacted.”311  Under the criterion of reciprocity, “[o]ur exercise of political 
power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would 
offer for our political actions – were we to state them as government officials 
308 Schwartzman, supra note 304, at 1359 (emphasis in original). 
309 RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 22, at 133. 
310 See id. at 141 (stating that “[t]he limiting feature of these forms [of public reason] is the criterion of 
reciprocity . . .”). For a full discussion of public reason’s complex requirements, see id. at 133-52. 
311 See id.      
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– are sufficient, and we also reasonably think other citizens could accept 
those reasons.”312   
Public reason’s constraints plausibly could defeat the State/Religion 
Asymmetry Critique.  If so, it would have to be determined whether public 
reason’s norms already are present and operative in the United States.  For 
example, the Establishment Clause’s neutrality requirement already may serve 
this role.313  If not, adoption of the Religious Institution Principle in 
American politics would have to be joined with adoption of public reason’s 
requirements.   
However, it ultimately is uncertain, for two reasons, whether public 
reason successfully defuses the State/Religion Asymmetry Critique.  First, it 
is unclear precisely what symmetry requires, and hence whether public reason 
satisfies it.   Second, it is not clear how much constraint public reason 
actually imposes.  Many Rawlsians sharply criticized  public reason for 
limiting the extent to which religious persons could bring their convictions to 
politics,314 and Rawls reworked public reason to include several caveats, most 
importantly the proviso,315 which collectively may mean (according to 
esteemed Rawlsian Samuel Freeman) that “majority democratic decision by 
itself is sufficient ‘public reason’ for restricting conduct.”316  While this 
probably is an overstatement, Freeman’s observation suggests public reason 
may have only limited bite.  If so, public reason might not satisfy a plausibly 
defined symmetry.  Though these are important questions, it is neither 
possible317 nor necessary (due to the next subsection) to finally settle public 
reason’s scope in this Article. 
  b. Why Symmetry Is Unnecessary 
Though aesthetics and intuition frequently generate strong initial 
expectations for symmetry, asymmetry is sometimes acceptable if not 
312 See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 22, at 137. 
313 See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860-61 (2005) (Establishment Clause bars 
laws with the “ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion;” the Clause “mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion”).  For a 
discussion of some of the complexities of contemporary establishment clause doctrine, see Mark D. 
Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 672-80 (2003). 
314 See, e.g., PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (Cambridge 2006);  
CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (Cambridge 2002); KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). 
315 See Martha Nussbaum, Rawls’s Political Liberalism:  A Reassessment, 24 RATIO JURIS 1, 11-19 (2011) 
(discussing the proviso and other modifications Rawls made in response to critics to the “duty of 
civility” and “public reason”). 
316 SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 80 (2007).  I am indebted to Andy Koppelman for directing me to this. 
317Public reason is a complex subject that has generated a cottage industry of high quality analysis. See, 
e.g., supra note 314.   
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preferable; consider what Picasso did to classical conceptions of symmetry-
premised beauty.318  In short, the need for symmetry cannot be assumed.  
In fact, deeper reflection shows there is no reason to think  that 
State/Religion Asymmetry is illogical, reflects bad faith, or is otherwise 
condemnable.  From within an internal Rawlsian analysis, 319 this can be seen 
by thinking back to first principles, and considering the incentives that are 
faced by persons in the original position. Participants are not philosophers 
striving toward maximal theoretical consistency, but ordinary (albeit 
imagined) people, acting under a veil of ignorance, who are choosing the 
fairest political system to which they will voluntarily submit themselves over 
time.  The first principle of justice reflects an understanding that participants 
behind the veil can be expected to have a hierarchy of concerns, with the 
result that they would be willing to allow political processes to decide some 
matters but not others; falling into the latter category is the formation and 
realization of the conception of the good of the persons they might 
represent.  It is this reasoning process that gives rise to limitations on the 
state, including the Religious Institution Principle and the Non-Religious 
Institution Principle.   
Public reason’s constraints on religion and other comprehensive 
views, however, are generated by an entirely different set of considerations. 
There accordingly is no reason to expect that public reason’s limitations will  
be “symmetrical” to the limitations  imposed by the Religious and non-
Religious Institution Principles. Rawls tells us that “[t]he idea of public 
reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that 
are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its 
citizens and their relation to one another.”320 In other words, public reason 
helps determine the circumstances that justify government’s exercise of 
coercive political authority over citizens.321  Public reason reflects the 
understanding that that “[o]ur exercise of political power is proper only when 
we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions 
– were we to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also 
318 For the classical view, see HERMANN WEYL, SYMMETRY.  For a discussion of Picasso’s rejection of 
then-prevailing symmetry norms, see JOHN RICHARDSON, A LIFE OF PICASSO:  THE TRIUMPHANT 
YEARS, 1917-32. 
319 This part of my argument is designed to show that the Religious Institution Principle is not a 
mistaken inference, but is consistent with the rest of Rawls’ framework.  It does not on its own defeat 
the asymmetry critique insofar as it presumes the appropriateness of the original position.  It shows, 
though, that  any asymmetry critique must be spelled out, and cannot tautologically be assumed 
problematic simply due to an absence of symmetry.  
320 Rawls, supra note 179, at 132. 
321 Id.(“ In short, [public reason] concerns how the political relation is to be understood.”) 
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reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those 
reasons.”322   
In short, since the considerations that give shape to public reason are 
fundamentally different from those that give rise to the Religious Institution 
Principle, there is no reason to expect symmetry in their scope.  The 
State/Religion Asymmetry Critique accordingly falls away. 
CONCLUSION 
The Religious Institution Principle’s derivation reveals why it is fair, 
and why it plausibly can be thought to be acceptable to both religious and 
non-religious citizens.  The Religious Institution Principle has the conceptual 
resources for determining (a) to what religions it does not apply, (b) what 
qualifies as a religious institution, (c) to what laws it applies, and (d) why and 
under what circumstances its protections are non-absolute.  The Religious 
Institution Principle instantiates the political architecture of overlapping 
spheres, and gives rise to a robust framework for analyzing the claims of 
religious institutions. 
 
322 See id. at 137. 
                                                   
